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Résumé 
Ce travail tourne autour d'une analyse féministe et déconstructive du concept de la 
"nature" dans un oeuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Émile ou de l'éducation. En se 
justifiant avec ce qui est ditfr'''naturel,'' Rousseau élabore deux programmes éducatii 
Jlun pour la femme idéale, l'autre pour l'homme idéal. Puisque la femme idéale est 
supposée d'être la contraire de l'homme idéal, Rousseau affirme qu'ils sont deux moitiés 
incomplètes qui forment ensemble un couple complet. Cependant, lorsqu'on creuse cette 
affirmation, on constate que ce n'est pas le cas. De plus, la contamination de la femme 
idéale et de l'homme idéal par des éléments non-naturels est un risque très sérieux. 
Rousseau nous indique à plusieurs reprises que l'étudiant ou l'étudiante pourrait être 
corrompu( e), mais je démontrerai que la contamination existe aussi partout dans le texte. 
Les oppositions "naturelles" établies par Rousseau eXist~ans un état perpétuel ~ i 
d'éffondrement qui nie et qui permet l'existence même de ces oppositions. En parlant de 
la topographie fantasmatique de Rousseau, je soulignerai comment les métaphores 
influencent la concePtion/ousseauiste de la nature et comment les incohérences ILl 
soutiennent cette conception là. Finalement, le rôle du sexe hétérosexuel entre la femme 
idéale et l'homme idéal servira d'exemple spectaculaire de l'éffondrement et du . 
relèvement simultané de la topographie fantasmatique et des oppositions naturelles. 
Comme toutes les oppositions, la conception Rousseauiste de la nature n'est pas pure 
face à son opposé (la société). La tension qui existe entre les deux termes d'une 
opposition permet et nie la possibilité même des termes opposés. 
Mots clés: Philosophie, Féminisme, Rousseau, Éducation, Derrida, Déconstruction. 
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Summary 
The present study offers a feminist and deconstructive analysis of the concept of 
"Nature" in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Émile ou de l'éducation. Relying upon what is 
deemed to be natural, Rousseau proposes two educational programmes: one meant for 
the ideal woman, the other for the ideal man. Through these educational prescriptions, 
two sets of specifie and markedly opposed gender norms emerge. l will trouble the 
Rousseauist claim that the ideal man and the ideal woman are supposed to be halves of a 
single whole (the heterosexual marital unit). The threat of contamination will also be 
addressed: throughout one's education-- and even once one's education is complete-- one 
may become contaminated by unnatural elements. Although Rousseau points out various 
occasions w~s contamination may occur, 1 will show that contamination is 
. rampant throughout the text; the "natural" oppositions or binarities Rousseau establishes 
are al ways collapsing into one another. l will touch upon Rousseau's phantasmatic 
topography in order to illustrate how his metaphors shape his understanding of the 
natural and summarise the incoherencies that make up his conception of nature. Finally, 
the necessary but dangerous heterosexual couplings between the ideal man and the ideal 
woman becorrie the site at which Rousseau's phantasmatic topography as weIl as its 
related matrices ofbinarities undo themselves just as they are asserted. The Rousseauist 
concept of nature is not pure of its opposite (society), nor is any other half of a binarity 
free from its opposite. Th.is tension both brings the opposition into being and 
simultane ou si y refuses it. 
Key words: Philosophy, Feminism, Rousseau, Education, Derrida, Deconstruction. 
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Introductory Remarks 
... 1 want to state as clearly as possible that there is a sense in which feminism 
already "is" deconstruction, and deconstruction "is" already feminism. And 
yet, with this said, they also do not collapse into one another and eliminate 
their differences. 
--Diane Elam, Feminism and Decans/rue/ion: Ms. en Abyme, p. 19 
Nature has long been appealed to as a source of goodness and rightness. The 
contemporary examples are numerous. Wh ether an argument against gay marriage is 
being fashioned, or a boy's roughhousing is being justified, nature or what is deemed to 
be "natural" has a moral weight. It is supposed to be in one's best interests to choose 
what is "natural." One certainly would not want ta allaH' ar ta became samething 
unnatural. 
But what is nature? WeIl, it is often conceived of as the opposite of societyl. 
Through this lens, nature becomes a place/time where one can see (or imagine) the 
original form ofhumanity in both its constitution and its habits. The specifics ofthis 
natural place/time may shift, but it may generally be understood as an origin of sorts, a 
place/time ofboth greater simplicity and purity than we know today. Society, on the 
other hand, is a place/time where humanity is-- at least in sorne sense-- "unnatural," 
artificial, or corrupted. A humanity which is socialised is at a necessary and marked 
remove from nature; this humanity is burdened and sullied by knowledge and social 
obligations which may include employment, marriage, politics and family. 
Because the concept of nature and the natural have su ch an apparent moral heft 
In the chapters that follow, 1 will use both the terms society and culture. Edward Bumett Tylor is often 
quoted as saying "Culture or civilisation, taken in its wide ethnographie sense, is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society" (PC, p. 1). In other words, individuals acquire certain 
attributes "by growing up in a particular society in which they are exposed to a specifie cultural 
tradition" (MH, p. 41). Most everyone is a member of society, yet different societies are shaped by 
different cultural practices and beliefs. 1 will most frequently use the term society. Though, on the 
occasions when 1 use the term culture, this should be understood as a specifie society with its own 
particular cultural blueprint. 
to them, 1 will turn my attention to a thinker for whom nature was an undoubtedly 
important construct: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. There are repeated appeals to nature and 
the natural throughout Rousseau's corpus. On various occasions, in Rousseau's hands, 
nature is used as (among other things): a heuristic device, an origin myth, an ideal. 
While 1 will outline sorne of the ways nature and the natural are used to justify 
Rousseau's claims, my main task will be to illuminate the contradictions embedded 
within the text as weIl as the phantasmatic topography which underlies Rousseau's 
theoretical writings. Though 1 will briefly refer to a few of his other works, my primary 
text will be Rousseau's Émile ou de l'éducation (hereafter Émile). 1 will examine the 
gender norms prescribed by Rousseau, the pervasive threat of contamination faced by 
those wise enough to follow his educational programme, and the way heterosexual sex 
acts as the site of interaction between oppositions which Rousseau intended to keep 
separate. Binarities will figure prominently in my work as 1 show the impossibility of 
truly making two opposite terms stand apart. 
My analysis will draw upon Jacques Derrida's writings and his strategy of 
2 
de construction. 1 seek to inhabit Émile in the style of Derrida, and 1 will draw from sorne 
of Derrida's writings about Rousseau. My goal is not to repeat Derrida's fine work; 1 
wish to use his analyses and his deconstructive approach for my own purposes. 
Before proceeding, 1 wish to offer a few explanations as weIl as a few caveats. 
Firstly, an important motivation for this project stems from my passionate interest and 
belief in feminism (and so also feminist philosophy). The question is: can feminism and 
de construction peaceably coexist? Both are certainly difficult to define: the first due to 
its breadth and diversity; the second due in large part to its troubling the very idea of 
definition. Diane Elam argues that: 
not only is the search for a universally agreed upon 
definition of 'feminism' and 'deconstruction' a waste 
oftime, it is also highly undesirable. For once you 
think you know what 'feminism' and 'deconstruction' 
are, then their political and ethical work is done. As 
1 have already hinted, short hand definitions, while 
practical at times, can easily lead to caricature, 
dismissal, and unnecessary limits placed on thought 
and political action2• 
Although quick definitions may be practical, they can also be in sorne sense perilous. 
Rather than offer definitions that ultimately do a disservice to both concepts, or devote 
many pages to a discussion of this tricky issue, 1 will assume the reader already has at 
least a sense of what these concepts mean; instead of defining them outright or 
discussing the difficulties in attempting to do so, 1 will propose how the two serve 
common interests and may improve one another as weIl. 
Perhaps most obviously, feminism and de construction each seek to trouble key 
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binarities; both seek to unearth incoherencies and to offer a more nuanced understanding 
of certain subjects. While deconstruction often troubles concepts within the academic 
context, feminism does its troubling in the academic realm and through grassroots work. 
Feminism and deconstruction are similar too in that their style and approach is 
challenging; neither takes well established concepts or practices as wholly justified or as 
being beyond revision3• 
One of the major ways deconstruction can improve feminism is by promoting 
self-criticism. Penelope Deutscher sums up this point well: 
2 FO, p. 4-5. 
3 This challenging style often results in personal attacks being leveled at feminists and deconstructionists 
alike. Also, feminism and deconstruction are frequently sa id to be the cause of great misfortunes. The 
examples are plentiful, but consider this one: "It is not uncommon to portray Derrida as the devil 
himself, a street-corner anarchist, a relativist, or subjectivist, or nihilist, out to destroy our traditions 
and institutions, our beliefs and values, to mock philosophy and truth itself, to undo everything the 
Enlightenment has done-- and to replace ail this with wild nonsense and irresponsible play" (ON, p. 
36). The work being done by both feminism and deconstruction can be profoundly unsettling-- as is 
shown in part bYthe fervour of the backlash they each suffer. 
... any feminism should be accompanied with a 
simultaneous effort to deconstruct feminism. This 
can be a constructive contribution to feminism. Many 
feminist writers have engaged in self-criticism about 
feminism's failure to adequately include the perspectives 
and priorities of women from different backgrounds, 
classes and cultures4• 
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Feminism would thus best be served if it were accompanied by a deconstructive gesture, 
or a simultaneous deconstruction, ofits own assertions. In this way, feminism would be 
more aware of its shortcomings and any concept, person, or nation it excludes in its 
efforts to further a particular agenda. In short, deconstruction could sharpen feminism 
with its reminder to be constantly vigilant, careful and self-critical. 
Deconstruction would primarily benefit from feminism's influence because it 
. would give deconstruction a more visibly tangible context. While language undoubtedly 
shapes our interactions and our understanding of the so-called real world, deconstruction 
is sometimes accused of being hyper-textual Cie: overly mired in the academic or the 
theoretical)5. If applied to feminist concerns, deconstruction would be more readily 
linked to more practical, everyday issues. 
FinaUy, 1 wish to offer the following caveat. In asserting that feminism and 
deconstruction may peaceably coexist, 1 do not mean to imply that Derrida's 
deconstructive project is inherently feminist or imbued with explicitly feminist 
sensibilities on his part. The issue of what role feminism plays in Derrida's texts is 
contentious at best, and otherwise completely deserving of its own in depth analysis6• 
My goal here is only to explain how 1 perceive the two as coexisting strategies and 
4 HT, p. 49. 
5 While deconstruction is admittedly mind-bending and usually used by academics, 1 do not believe the 
meat of Derrida's writings is at a remove to the "real" world. Quite the opposite! 
6 This question and its related issues has been approached by other authors. For a few examples, see the 
feminism and deconstruction section in the bibliography. 
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sensibilities, and thus as useful for this thesis. 
Before beginning my deconstructive analysis of Émile, l wish to make two more 
points. Firstly, throughout the text that follows, l use the terms "ideal woman" and "ideal 
man." These terms, while not found in Rousseau's text, serve as generic markers for the 
ideals manifested by Émile and Sophie. Though Rousseau told the particular story of 
Émile and Sophie, he was trying to sketch an educational programme that would be 
suitable to aIl (or, more precisely, suitable at least to those eighteenth century Europeans 
fortunate enough to be in the middle and upper classes). For simplicity's sake, l will 
speak of his ideas in a generalised "ideal man and ideal woman" way in order to 
underline the applicability Rousseau hoped his programme would have. 
Secondly, in Émile, Rousseau weaves between prescriptive and descriptive 
statements about the society in which he lived. Because of this weaving, he alternates 
between discussing the ideal woman and the wet nurse. In the eighteenth century, 
women of the middle- and upper-classes usually hired wet nurses and frequently sent 
their children away to boarding school once the y were of a certain age 7• Rousseau speaks 
contemptuously of this habit: 
Depuis que les mères, méprisant leur premier devoir, 
n'ont plus voulu nourrir leurs enfants, il a fallu les 
confier à des femmes mercenaires, qui, se trouvant 
ainsi mères d'enfants étrangers pour qui la nature ne 
leur disait rien, n'ont cherché qu'à s'épargner de la peines. 
Biological mothers are thus faulted for not assuming the burden ofbreastfeeding and 
child-rearing. Wetnurses are faulted for their lack ofnatural affection and their apparent 
7 SPE, p. 25. Additionally, of course, it is worth nothing that women of the lower-class could not afford 
, this practice. In Émile, Rousseau does not de vote time to considering whether these "real mother" 
women from his own society managed to embody their ideal; his focus was upon more well-to-do 
citizens. 
8 EE, p. 44. 
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disinterest in the children under their care. In short, Rousseau thought this trend to be 
deplorable and profoundly unnatural. Furthermore, he believed that much of society's ills 
could be remedied if women would only choose to be "real mothers" to their children: 
"Mais que les mères daignent nourrir leurs enfants, les mœurs vont se réformer d'elle-
mêmes, les sentiments de la nature se réveiller dans tous les cœurs; l'État va se 
repeupler: ce premier point, ce point seul va tout réunir9." 
Because ofthis tension between what was the case among well-to-do families in 
Rousseau's time and what he thought should be the norm, in a prescriptive gesture he 
maintained that the ideal woman should rai se her own child; this would include 
breastfeeding the child as well as tending to its needs. And, in a descriptive gesture, he 
sometimes dictated how the wet nurse should do her job. l will point out occasions in my 
work where confusion may result from the way Rousseau shifts between these two 
modes (prescriptive and descriptive) and thereby shifts who he is discussing (the ideal 
woman or the wet nurse). 
Now that my project has been sketched in its broadstrokes, the compatibility of 
feminism and deconstruction has been touched upon, and sorne of my terminology has 
been explained, let us now tum to the issue of gender norms in Émile; what 
differentiates the ideal man from the ideal womin and how is nature used to justify such 
distinctions? 
9 EE, pp. 47-48. 
Chapter One: Nature and Norrns 
Dès qu'une fois il est démontré que l'homme et la femme ne sont ni ne doivent 
être constitués de même, de caractère ni de tempérament, il s'ensuit qu'ils ne 
doivent pas avoir la même éducation. 
--Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, p. 473 
One of the foundational elements of Rousseau's treatise on education (as weIl as 
ofhis phantasmatic topography) involves the distinct and opposite natures of man and 
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woman. In order to show the path others should follow, Rousseau concems himselfwith 
ideals: the ideal man and the ideal woman. Because of the differences between the two 
and the distinct roles they are meant to assume in society, the ideal man and the ideal 
woman should not be educated in the same way. Throughout Émile, Rousseau creates 
the ideal man and the ideal woman by establishing certain gender norms; by describing 
the constitution and tasks appropriate to each, Rousseau sketches a picture of what the 
ideal man and the ideal woman should be like. This Rousseauist sketch relies on 
repeated appeals to Nature or the natural in order to justify itself and maintain its own 
integrity. 
With particular attention given to the natural justifications for the gender norrns, l 
will outline sorne of the ideal man's personality traits and his socially useful skills. l will 
then explain sorne of the ideal woman's gender norrns and the natural justifications 
thereof. Because so much of the ideal woman's gender norrns exist in relation to others, 
the ideal man's gender norrns will reverberate throughout my discussion of the ideal 
woman. Additionally, since the ideal woman exists primarily in relation to others, l 
have chosen to explain sorne of her personality traits and socially useful skills through 
the two main categories of woman that exist in the text: mother and wife. The division 
between mother and wife is in sorne sense artificial since the two roles often coincide. 
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This artificiality is reflected in my choice to mention the importance of certain traits or 
skills for both categories. The division, in this case, serves to highlight which aspects of 
the gender norms seem to be the most significant to either the mother or the wife; it is 
not a matter of claiming certain elements are exclusive to the mother or to the wife. 
The gender norms established by Rousseau create the oppositionality of the ide al 
man and the ideal woman. Since the two are opposites, they are supposed to complement 
and complete each other as a heterosexual marital unit. However, 1 will argue that such a 
marital unit does not in fact constitute a "whole" oftwo halved individuals. 1 will then 
examine the importance of a woman's body for her norms and discuss the ramifications 
of the ideal woman always being associated to her sex. To highlight the seriousness of 
what is being required of each gendered type, 1 will examine a few of the sanctions 
suffered by those who choose to betray their particular gender norms as weil as the 
rewards that would be enjoyed by those who carefully respect their gender norms. The 
chapter will close with a brief discussion of the supplement, and the binarities that are 
exemplified by Rousseau's gender norms. 
One of the key personality traits of the ideal man is his independence. A child 
must be raised in accordance with his primitive dispositions which are said to consist of 
what we are drawn to or repulsed bylO. For example, a baby is sa id to naturally seek out 
pleasure and to avoid pain. Primitive dispositions may be progressively altered by habit 
as the child ages; the natural primitive dispositions may be replaced by unnatural or 
undesirable dispositions. Society is responsible for the "bastardisation" of the natural 
within the child; the educational programme that is elaborated in Émile will socialise the 
child.in a way that is respectful ofhis nature. One must either choose to raise the boy 
10 EE, p. 38. 
into a man or a citizen; the two options are mutually exclusive. While discussing the 
oppositional tension between nature's and society's pull on the boy, the reader is asked: 
"[quoi faire] quand, au lieu d'élever un homme pour lui-même, on veut l'élever pour les 
autres?lI" This rhetorical question underlines the importance of a boy's-- and later a 
man's-- independence. To socialise the boy in a way that respects his nature is to rai se 
him for himself. To socialise him in a way that strips away his naturalness and replaces 
it with sorne sort of social construction is to make him dependent on others. The natural 
independence of a boy must be respected. His education must therefore encourage the 
development of his natural independence. 
The significance of the ideal man's independence is illuminated by the two types 
of dependence: 
Il y a deux sortes de dépendances: celle des choses, qui 
est de la nature; celle des hommes, qui est de la société. 
La dépendance des choses, n'ayant aucune moralité, ne 
nuit point à la liberté, et n'engendre point de vices; la 
dépendance des hommes étant désordonnée les engendre 
tous, et c'est par elle que le maître et l'esclave se dépravent 
mutuellement '2 . 
The only acceptable (ie: natural) form of dependence is that which involves a reliance 
upon objects and not on other individuals. In the state of nature, the natural man was 
solitary and survived thanks to his wits and his strength. While the natural man 
depended on objects in his environment for survival (such as food and makeshift 
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shelters), dependence on others did not figure into this origin myth. While the ideal man 
cannot retum to this state of nature, a proper Rousseauist education may permit him to 
embody certain gendered traits that echo what is truly natural. Therefore, since the 
natural man was utterly without dependence on others, the well-educated and pro perl y-
Il EE, p. 8. 
12 EE, pp. 100-101. 
socialised ideal man should also avoid relying on others; the ideal man should be 
independent. 
The ide al man's genderedpersonality trait of independence resurfaces near the 
end of Émile, when the précepteur lovingly praises the wonders ofwalkingl3 : 
Je ne conçois qu'une manière de voyager plus agréable 
que d'aller à cheval; c'est d'aller à pied. On part à son 
moment, on s'arrête à sa volonté, on fait tant et si peu 
d'exercise qu'on veut. On observe tout le pays; on se 
détourne à droite, à gauche; on examine tout ce qui 
nous flatte; on s'arrête à tous les points de vue. 
Aperçois-je une rivière, je la côtoie; un bois touffu, 
je vais sous son ombre; une grotte, je la visite; une 
carrière, j'examine les minéraux. Partout oùje me plais, 
j'y reste. A l'instant que je m'ennuie, je m'en vais. Je ne 
dépends ni des chevaux ni du postillon. Je n'ai pas besoin 
de choisir des chemins tout faits, des routes commodes; 
je passe partout où un homme peut passer; je vois tout 
ce qu'un homme peut voir; et, ne dépendant que de 
moi-même, je jouis de toute la liberté dont un homme 
peut jouir. Si le mauvais temps m'arrête et que l'ennui me 
gagne, alors je prends des chevaux l4 • 
There is a certain seductiveness inherent in the use of narrative and its related 
metaphors, similes or analogies. Showing one of the ideal man's traits in a natural 
environment encourages the reader to perceive the trait as natural too; the traits may 
become natural by virtue oftheir literary context. Rousseau may find naturalness 
seductive because he is disappointed by society. Nostalgia for a "lost naturalness" 
encourages Rousseau to be seduced by the natural; a similar nostalgia may also 
encourage his readers to believe the natural Rousseauist rhetoric. 
Let us return to the example at hand. Wa1king àllows the man to savour ms 
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independence from others while appreciating various' natural phenomenon. He is able to 
13 The walking analogy also serves to reinforce the importance of the ideal man's freedom. For the 
moment, 1 chose to read the excerpt only in terms of its relevance to the ideal man's independence. 
14 EE, p. 540. 
Il 
walk at his own pace, choosing where and when and how long he stops to enjoy certain 
elements of the natural setting. He need not follow roads that have already been made; 
he sets aside conventional ways oftraversing the landscape (such as following a path or 
riding a horse). These conventional methods oftravel are effective, but they do not 
spring forth from nature (rather, they are produced by society). A horse must be 
domesticated for one to ride it and a road must be built by skilled workers or at least 
wom into existence by many who walk the same route. While walking through the 
woods, man is not limited by a means of travel that exists because of society. Instead, he 
is limited only by himself: his body's capabilities, his personal interests and his 
endurance. The ideal and well-educated man who walks in the forest is an echo of the 
natural man who roamed free in the state of nature. The ideal man is thus able to 
recapture the feeling of being truly natural as man once was in the state of nature. 
However, walking through the woods-- this savouring of his independence-- may be set 
aside as needed. Should bad weather or boredom consume him, mounting a horse once 
more is perfectly acceptable. 
Another personality trait the ideal man ought to possess is freedom. This quality 
cannot be conceived of as being strictly a personality trait, as it also plays a key role in 
the ideal man's social position. Freedom is paramount from the outset; the boy's body 
should never be unduly restricted. Such an assertion is validated in part by condemning 
the practice of tightly binding newboms: 
15 EE, p. 44. 
L'inaction, la contrainte où l'on retient les membres 
d'un enfant, ne peuvent que gêner la circulation du 
sang, des humeurs, empêcher l'enfant de se fortifier, 
de croître, et altérer sa constitutionl5 • 
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Binding newboms compromises their physical growth which in tum compromises their 
personal growth. Freedom extends also to the boy's actions; he should not be forbidden 
from doing things for unjust reasons. For example, one should not prevent the boy from 
doing that which will cause pain because this experience will provide him with 
invaluable knowledge of the world. A boy who has endured physical restrictions or has 
had unreasonable limits placed upon his actions could not hope to become the ideal man. 
In the Second Book of Émile, a comparison is drawn between a country boy and 
a city boy which serves to underline the significance of freedom to the ideal man: 
La gêne perpétuelle où vous tenez vos élèves irrite leur 
vivacité; plus ils sont contraints sous vos yeux, plus ils 
sont turbulents au moment qu'ils s'échappent; il faut bien 
qu'ils se dédommagent quand ils peuvent de la dure 
contrainte où vous les tenez. Deux écoliers de la ville 
feront plus de dégât dans un pays que la jeunesse de 
tout un village. Enfermez un petit monsieur et un 
petit paysan dans une chambre; le premier aura tout 
renversé, tout brisé, avant que le second soit sorti de 
sa place. Pourquoi cela, si ce n'est que l'un se hâte 
d'abuser d'un moment de licence, tandis que l'autre, 
toujours sûr de sa liberté, ne se presse jamais d'en 
user? Et cependant les enfants des villageois, souvent 
flattés ou contrariés, sont encore bien loin de l'état 
oùje veux qu'on les tienne 16• 
A boy will behave well when within view ofthose who have compromised his freedom, 
but he will seize the chance to throw off the limitations imposed upon'hÏm by behaving 
poorly. To put it more colloquially: If you keep a boy on too tight of a leash, he will 
rebel when the occasion presents itself. Boys raised in the largely negative environment 
of the city will cause more problems than boys raised in the largely positive environment 
of the country. This point is emphasised through "improvised statistics"; two city boys 
will do more damage than a whole village's worth of country boys. In fact, if a city boy 
16 EE, p. Ill. 
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and a country boy were locked in a room together, the city boy would be the one to 
break things. The country boy would not be tempted by the opportunity to wreak havoc; 
. his freedom was never unduly restricted, so he would feel no need to reassert his 
freedom through violence and destruction. I1's worth noting that, in the case of the city 
boy, an attempt to curb a boy's freedom results in a spontaneous if opportunity-sensitive 
resistance. The power of the natural makes itselfknown in this way; the city boy rebels 
and thus lays claim to his freedom in a forceful and destructive manner. 
The "country context" is often used in an effort to illustrate what should he. 
Nature is thereby romanticised and used as a vehicle for expressing moral prescriptions. 
However, the country context, like aIl types of society, is at a remove from the state of 
nature. Thus it too is imperfect and guilty of raising children in a way that doesn't 
adequately respect their nature. Still, the country context is much closer to getting it 
right than its opposite, the city context. The country context is a source of good 
examples that will suffice yet which do not wholly embody the natural ideal that 
Rousseau holds dear. 
Although there are several socially useful skills that are required of the ideal 
man, l will focus on two main components ofthose requirements. Firstly, let us examine 
the ideal man's disinterest in others' opinions. One of the traits that make the ideal man 
essentially good is the fact that he does not compare himself to others: "ce qui rend 
l'homme essentiellement bon est d'avoir peu de besoins, et de peu se comparer aux 
autres; ce qui le rend essentiellement méchant est d'avoir beaucoup de besoins, et de 
tenir beaucoup à l'opinion17." The ideal man should not let others' opinions shape who he 
is or what he chooses to do. In a manner of speaking, the ideal man must be ip sorne 
17 EE, p. 2n 
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sense impermeable to the social influence of others' opinions. If the ideal man did not 
have this resistance to opinions, his carefully realised and respectful-of-his-nature 
education would be compromised. For the ideal man, to be receptive to opinions is to be 
open to the possibility of being distanced from his properly denatured self. 
Another of the ideal man's socially useful skills requires that he educate his 
future wife. Her disposition, experiences and "unofficial education" will have made her 
into "une terre bien préparée qui n'attend que le grain pour rapporterI8 ." Another 
metaphor that refers to natural processes, or objects which are found in nature. What 
could be more natural than planting a seed in well prepared and fertile soil so that a new 
plant may eventually grow? The task at hand is characterised as joyous and pleasant for 
the ideal man. He has the opportunity to shape the ideal woman's mind based on his own 
learnings. 
A selection of the gender norms assigned to the ideal woman will now be seen 
through the lens of a particular category of woman: the mother. Whereas the boy 
required freedom to become an ideal man, the girl requires a limited form of freedom to 
become an ideal woman. Woman is said to be more prone to extremes and thus too 
mu ch freedom might result in her acquiring certain vices l9• Where boys whose freedom 
was infringed upon seized certain opportunities to act out, girls will act out if given the 
freedom enjoyed by boys who are raised according to the Rousseauist educational 
'programme. 
A limited freedom for girls is justified in the following excerpt: "Accoutumez-les 
à se voir interrompre au milieu de leurs jeux, et ramener à d'autres soins sans murmurer. 
18 EE, p. 538. 
19 EE, p. 482. 
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La seule habitude suffit encore en ceci, parce qu'elle ne fait que seconder la nature20." 
One should interrupt a girl's playtime and have her tend to other tasks. She is to accept 
this without complaint. It is only a matter of establishing such a routine with the girl, 
since the course of action in question simply mirrors what is natural. A limited freedom 
is relevant to a mother's experience since any "playful" or enjoyable activities will have 
to be set aside in favour of tending to the baby or to other domestic tasks. Ideally, of 
course, the mother would do so without complaint. 
Unlike the city boy's outburst against the limitations imposed upon his freedom, 
here the girl appears to have no natural stirrings against said limitations. Rousseau does 
not even differentiate between a city girl and a country girl; neither sort of girl is said to 
have natural stirrings against il limited freedom. She is not said to seize the first 
opportunity to showcase her freedom through destruction. It is only necessary to get the 
girl into the habit ofhaving a limited freedom. This habit mirrors her natural 
requirement for such a restriction. Although there may be a brief period where the girl 
must leam not to complain or fuss when taken away from her p1aytime, she will quickly 
adapt and thereby her behaviour will mirror her natural inclinations. 
The main socially useful task of the mother is to take care of the child's first 
education: 
La première éducation est celle qui importe le plus, et 
cette première éducation appartient incontestablement 
aux femmes: si l'Auteur de la nature eût voulu qu'elle 
appartient aux hommes, il leur eût donné du lait pour 
nourrir les enfants21 • 
The first or natural education is the ideal woman's responsibility. More precisely, it is 
the mother's responsibility; the ability to lactate and to breastfeed is identified as the 
20 EE, p. 482. 
21 EE, p. 35. 
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reason why this particular task is assigned to woman and not to man. The first or natural 
education involves the development of one's faculties and one's organs; it is also said to 
occur independently ofus22 • In short, the main task of the mother is to ensure that the 
baby survives its first education. The mother must tend to the baby's physical needs, 
thereby allowing the child to reach an age where the next stage of education may begin. 
ln the case of a boy, the mother will hand off her son to a suitable précepteur so that he 
may oversee his later education. In the case of a girl, the mother will play more of a role 
in the child's development. The mother will help to ready the girl's mind and spirit for 
the education she will eventually receive from her husband as weIl as the tasks and the 
disposition required of the girl when she becomes a wife. It is imperative that the first or 
natural education proceed without incident, or el se later educations would invariably 
fail. 
It is wise at this juncture to repeat that the gender norrns associated with both the 
mother and the wife are not based on a hard and fast division. There is a fair degree of 
overlap where the norrns are required of the ideal woman regardless of the role she 
assumes. AIso, the two roles frequently overlap in practice when the woman is both a 
wife and mother. 1 chose to use the se two lenses in part to highlight how women exist 
primarily as "bookends" in the text. She is present as the mother, in charge of the baby 
boy's first education, then she is gone. She returns as a future wife when the boy has 
reached maturity. Rer principal roles consist in maintaining the naturalness of the baby 
and in aiding the grown boy into a larger social context. 1 mention this point only 
briefly, as it will resurface later in my work. 
Let us now change the lens through which we've been viewing a selection of the 
22 EE, p. 37, 
gender norms assigned to the ideal woman. Let us turn to what may be called the main 
features and obligations of the wife. Firstly, just like the mother, the wife is defined 
chiefly by her dependence. The wife is passive where the husband is active, therefore 
she is subjugated to him and must also seek to please him23 • She is dependent upon her 
husband because he is active while she is not. Staying in the husband's good graces is 
vital, for the wife depends on the husband for her survival. The need to please her 
husband is not a law oflove, but rather a law of nature which precedes love itself24 • 
Wives are also said to depend on their husbands due to their desires and their needs, 
whereas husbands are said to "depend" on their wives only because oftheir desires25 • 
Wives, the n, are financially dependent on their husbands. They are at a natural 
disadvantage to the husband who relies on his wife only out of sexual desire. 
The wife is said to be concerned with her appearance. While distinguishing it 
from a boy's concerns, this interest is traced back to her childhood experiences: 
Les garçons cherchent le mouvement et le bruit: des 
tambours, des sabots, de petits carrosses; les filles 
aiment mieux ce qui donne dans la vue et sert à 
l'ornement: des miroirs, des bijoux, des chiffons, 
surtout des poupées: la poupée est l'amusement 
spécial de ce sexe; voilà très évidemment son 
goût déterminé sur sa destination26• 
Boys like toys that involve movement and noise; girls enjoy toys that involve playing 
dress-up. The girl's taste for doUs reflects the style and attitude she is to assume as an 
ideal woman. She should interest herself in clothes and attractiveness, although she 
should not be excessively interested in such things. A taste for dolls and for its 
17 
associated values occurs naturally in the girl; nobody forces her to take an active interest 
23 EE, p. 466· 
24 EE, p. 466. 
25 EE, p. 475. 
26 EE, pp. 478-479. 
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in doUs. Because the interest is natural, the interest should be encouraged on into 
adulthood; a wife must make herself attractive without being concerned with expensive 
jewels or other social trappings. 
Another pivotaI norm associated with the ideal wife concerns her tolerance for 
injustice. Rather than reconstruct what is said in the text, 1 offer the following pertinent 
excerpt: 
En un mot, elle souffre avec patience les torts des autres, 
et répare avec plaisir les siens. Tel est l'aimable naturel 
de son sexe avant que nous l'ayons gâté. La femme est 
faite pour céder à l'homme et pour supporter même son 
injustice. Vous ne réduirez jamais les jeunes garçons au 
même point; le sentiment intérieur s'élève et se révolte 
en eux contre l'injustice; la nature ne les fit pas pour 
la tolérer27 • 
If not compromised by social intervention, the wife has a natural tolerance for injustice. 
She is naturally made to defer to the ideal man and to suffer any injustices he 
perpetrates. The ideal man could never be reduced to sharing such a tolerance because 
nature has instilled in him a sensibility that rebels against injustice. In order to fully 
embody the ideal, the wife must adhere to this gender norm. She must not offer any 
resistance to the injustices she may endure. 
, The last gender norm assigned to the wife that 1 will discuss concerns the 
importance of others' opinions. Where these have no bearing on the ideal man, they are 
quite significant for the ideal woman as wife: 
27 EE, p. 520. 
28 EE, p. 475. 
L'homme, en bien faisant, ne dépend que de lui-même, 
et peut braver le jugement public; mais la femme, en 
bien faisant, n'a fait que la moitié de sa tâche, et ce que 
l'on pense d'elle ne lui importe pas moins que ce qu'elle 
est en effet28• 
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The ideal man who does good need pay no attention to what others think. In contrast, the 
ideal woman-- and the wife in particular-- who does good must also be seen or believed 
by others to be doing good. At least in part, this reliance on others' opinions may be 
explained by her natural dependence on the ideal man. She must exist in a relation with 
others in order for her actions-- and arguably for herself-- to gain credibility. The wife's 
financial dependence on the husband may emphasise the need not only to behave weil 
but also to be perceived as behaving weIl. For example, if the husband believed she was 
not being faithful, this could have disastrous consequences for the wife even if she had 
not in fact committed adultery. 
Although this may have become quite evident throughout the discussion of 
certain gender norms, the ideal man and the ideal woman are meant to be opposites. For 
example, thanks to the educational programme prescribed by Rousseau, the ideal man 
will be independent and free, where the ideal woman will be dependent and enjoy only a 
limited freedom. Rousseau describes the two as being halves of a whole: the 
heterosexual marital unit. The perfect man and the perfect woman should not resemble 
each other29• Instead, their differences each serve the heterosexual marital unit in unique 
ways which are specifie to their respective genders30• 
1 stress that the marital unit is a hèterosexual one for two main reasons. Firstly,· 
Rousseau spends no time discussing homosexual or transgendered relationships in 
Émile. This should not come as too much of a shock, however, considering the time in 
which he wrote31 : Secondly, Rousseau says "Un sexe est attiré vers l'autre: voilà le 
29 EE, p. 466. 
30 EE, p. 466. 
31 My point here is certainly not to claim that history is in a perpetuai and relentless march towards 
progress so therefore eontemporary interests are undoubtedly "better" than modem ones'. WhiJe J 
believe LGBT rights and queer theory are highly pertinent and engaging, my point is not to condemn 
or dismiss modern thinkers for their lack of insight or interest in sueh topies. Instead, my point is only 
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mouvement de la nature32." The only attraction that is deemed natural is between a man 
and a woman. While opening a can of worms that 1 do not have the space to properly 
address here, the quote does at least underline Rousseau's heteronormative views where 
"natural" attraction and "natural" pairings are deemed to be exclusively heterosexuaI. 
The ideal man and the ideal woman are said to be in sorne sense incomplete 
without the other. They are meant to complement each other, thereby forming a whole 
which is better than each individuaI. However, it is difficult to fathom how the ideal man 
is not already whole as an individuaI. Sorne of the ideal woman's traits such as sexual 
attractiveness and her gentleness [transI. of "douceur"] are supposed to temper or 
"tenderise" the ideal man; 1 struggle to see how such an influence can be said to act upon 
an ideal man who is not already whole in and of himself. He is independent and free. He 
knows a trade; he is active, particularly in the public sphere. In stark contrast, the ideal 
woman must not appear in public after marriage33 • Her dependence means that she is "à 
la merci des jugements de l'homme34." Her responsibilities as both mother and wife 
infringe upon what might be called her ability to be whole on her own. 1 see the 
opposition Rousseau sought to establish between man and woman as in fact unfolding 
thusly: The ideal man is a wholly formed member of society, an "unto-itself," whereas 
the ideal woman is a truncated or unfinished member of society. 
This situation may be best encapsulated by de Beauvoir: 
En s'attribuant exclusivement sa postérié, l'homme se 
dégage définitivement de l'emprise de l~ féminité, il 
conquiert contre la femme la domination du monde. 
Vouée à la procréation et à des tâches secondaires, 
dépouillée de son importance pratique et de son prestige 
that Rousseau's historical context was likely not very conducive to such thinking or sensitivities. 
32 EE, p. 277. 
33 EE, p. 477. 
34 EE, p. 475. 
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mystique, la femme n'apparaît plus que comme servante35 • 
Within their union, the ideal man is the dominant and assertive figure; he in tum rules 
the world as he distances himself from female tasks and feminity in general. The ideal 
man and the ideal woman do not complement each other as incomplete halves. Instead, 
the ideal woman-- with her domestic responsibilities and her temperament-- is a 
"halved" or unfinished creature while the ideal man is whole, an individual. 
The importance of the body for the ideal woman's gender norms has thus far 
gone unexplicited, even though it has at least been suggested. Consider that motherhood 
necessarily follows from the woman's breast (or her ability to lactate). Remember also 
the wife's interest in and maintenance ofher appearance. Notwithstanding mentions of 
the body used to justify or explain certain norrns established for the ideal man, the 
figurative weight of the female body is heavier for the ideal woman. 
This particular and gendered importance may resonate in Rousseau's taking an 
interest in both the wet nurse's diet and Sophie's sweet tooth. In the first case, Rousseau 
considers! both the country woman's eating opposed to that of the city woman as weIl as 
the diet of camivorous animaIs opposed to that of herbivores36• He seeks to deterrnine 
what diet, when consumed by a wet nurse37, would pioduce the best and the most milk. 
While it is legitimate to wonder what foods or substances would produce the best milk 
for a baby's health, the way in which Rousseau addresses this question stresses her 
animality or her bodiliness. It is not written in the style of a guide book for women who 
are wet nurses. Instead it is-- somewhat humourously-- written in the style of a farrner's 
manual. 
35 OS, p. 104. 
36 EE, pp. 64-65. 
37 Here Rousseau draws upon the descriptive: the fact that wet nurses were cornrnon in certain well-to-do 
circ1es in his tirne. 
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In the second case, in order to curb Sophie's sweet tooth, it is explained that 
eating too many sweets will result in rotten teeth and and overly plump waistline38 • 
While both can be understood as valid health risks, the significance of her body is also 
underlined. Her appearance would undoubtedly be compromised should her teeth be 
rotten or her waist too ample. 
Part of why the ideal woman's body is so pertinent may be explained by the ide al 
woman always being linked to her sex. Rousseau says several contradictory things 
regarding sex differences and when the ideal man or the ideal woman is properly 
associated with their sex. Initially, he maintains that we are born twice: once as a 
member of one's species, then again as a member of one's sex39• This would lead one to 
believe that both the ideal man and the ideal woman would be their sex once they 
reached a certain point in their education and their physical development. However, 
Rousseau later asserts the following: 
Il n'y à nulle parité entre les deux sexes quant à la 
conséquence du sexe. Le màle [sic] n'est mâle qu'en 
certains instants, la femelle est femelle toute sa vie, ou 
du moins toute sa jeunesse; tout la rappelle sans cesse 
à son sexe, et, pour bien remplir les fonctions, il lui faut 
une constitution qui s'y rapporte40• 
Here, the ideal man is only a member of male sex at certain moments in his life, whereas 
the ideal woman must be a member ofthe female sex for every moment in her life. To 
properly fulfill the roles of wife and mother, she must also have a certain disposition. 
Rousseau goes on to list the various qualities required of the ideal woman so that she 
may successfully bear and raise children, manage the household and maintain the 
cohesion of the family unit. Once the ideal woman's youth has passed, presumably once 
38 EE, p. 519. 
39 EE, p. 273. ' 
40 EE, p. 470. 
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she has done aIl of the above, then she may be seen as no longer belonging to her sex; 
since she will no longer be able to use her bodylfor reproductive purposes, she would no 
longer be seen as being her sex. That said, for the vast majority of the ideal woman's life, 
she will be a me'mber of her sex. It is in part because of her uterus and her breasts that 
she is said to always be so, while the ideal man will only be a member of his sex at 
certain moments such as when he is sexually aroused or sexually engaged. Otherwise, 
his male body does not shape his existence as the female body shapes that of the ideal 
woman. 
The best proof that the traits and activities prescribed for the ideal man and for 
the ideal woman are in fact norms may be found in the mention of both sanctions and 
rewards in Émile. Let us first consider how important it is that a girl be raised 
according to the feminine norms. Rousseau addresses himself to the mother: "Croyez-
moi, mère judicieuse, ne faites point de votre fille un honnête homme, comme pour 
donner un démenti à la nature; faites-en une honnête femme, et soyez sûre qu'elle en 
vaudra mieux pour elle et pour nous41 ." Should one raise a girl by the norms specific to 
the ideal man, one would create a fiercely unnatural creature, a monster. 
As for the boy, he must also respect his gender norms. He must choose a trade 
that is manly and thus appropriate to him. Rousseau makes light of Italian men who 
work in boutiquès, using their large, manly hands to sell delicate cloths and ribbons to 
women42 • Such work is ill-suited to the ideal man who is best occupied by certain types 
ofphysically demanding labour. If a man should choose an unmanly trade, he risks 
being sanctioned by his peers43 • Not only will he be going against nature, he will also 
41 EE, p. 474. 
42 EE, p. 260. 
43 It is unclear exactly who or what will sanction the man, although 1 assume other men who better 
exemplify their ideal will do the sanctioning. 
have to suffer the ridicule of others. He may also be ostracised, considered either as a 
womanly man or as an idiot. 
A woman who does not respect her gender norms may also suffer certain 
sanctions. For example, should a mother raise her child in a distinctly un-Rousseauist 
fashion, she may endure the consequences ofthis failure once she is old or widowed44 • 
In part explained by the child's own improperly socialised self, the grown chi Id may 
choose to mistreat her or to deny her financial support. 
Rousseau also suggests the possibility of certain rewards for mothers who do 
their job according to their gender norms: 
... j'ose promettre à ces dignes mères un attachement 
solide et constant de la part de leurs maris, une tendresse 
vraiment filiale de la part de leurs enfants, l'estime et le 
respect du public, d'heureuses couches sans accident et 
sans suites, une santé ferme et vigoureuse, enfin le plaisir 
de se voir un jour imiter par leurs filles, et citer en exemple 
à celles d'autrui45 • 
The successful ideal mother would enjoy the following benefits: a devoted husband, 
loving children, respect from one's peers, easy and uncomplicated births, excellent 
24 
health, the joy ofwitnessing her girls follow her example, and the pride ofbeing a good 
example for others. The remarkable rewards of being a good mother extend from strong 
social approval to personal well-being. Though if is quite absurd to promise good health 
and easy labour to good mothers, this promise c1early shows the extent of the goodness 
that will come from a mother who respects her gender norms. 
One of the key rewards offered to the ideal man is a "Sophie-esque" mate. Such a 
mate is rare and difficult to find46, yet she will provide much for her husband. She will 
44 EE, pp. 35-36. 
45 EE, p. 48. 
46 EE, p. 430. 
25 
be his wife and the mother to his children. She will make sure the household runs 
smoothly. She will assure the proper development of the children throughout their first 
education. She will act as the mediator between him and nature. While working within 
the limits ofher own modesty, she will satisfy his sexual needs. She will also be his 
pupil; he will teach her what he has leamed over the years. 
Allow me now to pull a few loose ends together. When Rousseau asserts that a 
girl should not be raised into an "honest man," he suggests that socialisation could in 
sorne way complete woman. By implication, he admits the possibility of a girl following 
and successfully finishing the educational programme prescribed for a boy. In such a 
case, rather than being unfinished or halved, the woman would become complete in the 
masculine sense of the term; she would therefore embody the ideals and satisfy the 
obligations traditionallyassigned to the ideal man. And still, a daughter raised according 
to the masculine educational programme is said to be a monster. If this natural 
completion of the individual is reserved for the ideal man alone, then what does this 
imply for the ideal woman? 
Upon first glance, it seems that the ideal woman is never natural, if a being may 
be called natural only when it is biologically male and possesses the traits of a man who 
has followed Rousseau's masculine educational programme. This interpretation explains 
why a woman would be called a monster if she received the same education as a man. 
"Completion" as an individual is a monstrous possibility for a woman. Altematively, in 
the interest of testing the limits of the concept, 1 believe that Rousseau's "nature" 
bifurcates into (1) a nature that gives itself entirely over to maintaining the well-being of 
the species through child-bearing and child-rearing as well as into (2) a nat~re that 
separates itself from the interests of the species. The ideal man must adhere to the 
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second conception of nature, while the ideal woman must align herself with the first. 
This dialectic is one in which nature has two tasks. The first task of nature 
belongs to women by virtue of their physical ability to bear and feed the young; it 
involves the reproduction and the perpetuation of the species. Since her body 
predisposes her to the first task of nature, the woman's education should simply 
encourage such an innate disposition, thereby helping her to reach her ideal. The second 
task of nature belongs to men and it involves in the production of individuals. These 
individuals-- men-- are free to tend to matters that do not directly relate to the 
reproduction of the species. 
Nature is thereby constituted by two OPPosi~ne which produces 
individuals, and another which produces beings who serve the interests of the species. 
These two natural teloi are gendered; producing individuals is the telos of nature for the 
ideal man, while producing beings who serve the interests of the species is the natural 
telosfor the ideal woman. Most of the book is devoted to the elaboration of a masculine 
educational programme which results in independent, free, male individuals. 
Comparatively, little time is spent explaining the nuances of the feminine educational 
programme. Additionally, as 1 have shown, the ideal woman is a halved and unfinished 
creature as she tends to the obligations associated with her species, while the ideal man 
is whole and unburdened by the obligations of his species. The natural telos reserved for 
the ideal man is the best option presented in Émile. 
If individuals are the "best" telos of nature, then this is possible only because 
sorne aspect ofhuman existence allows nature to produce human beings differently than 
it does wit~ other animais. One does not commonly see a lion who chooses to opt out of 
species-specific obligations in favour oflearning a trade; free, autonomous individuals 
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do not appear to exist anywhere else but in man. In this light, who then is the monster? 
Is it the individual, a natural product of education who is not quite natural? Or is it the 
rare woman who sets aside the concems of the species because of the (masculine) 
education she received? 
The goodness that will grace the woman who lives in service of the species and 
the iIl that win befaIl her if she were to become an "unwomanly" individual suggest that 
to be a natural being is to properly represent the ends of the species. Of course, the 
individual (the man) does not do this. In fact, it seems that a natural being is 
characterised as serving the species in ail cases except those of men. Rather than exclude 
men from membership in the species, perhaps in their case, to be a species is to be 
precisely (if perversely) an individual. With the ideal man exemplifying the "best" telos 
of nature, the traditional conception of a species faIls into impossibility. Ideal women, 
since they occupy themselves with the "second best" or secondary natural telos that 
serves the .ends of the species, therefore faIl into a state of impossibility as weIl. 
What might explain how nature can produce an individual that is so different 
from what it usual1y produces (ie: species)? One might explain it with the concept of a 
supplement at work in Émile, This supplement makes the concept of nature dualist: one, 
pure; the other, supplemented. The following quotation may help to illuminate the 
supplement and its influence in the text: 
The supplement has the connotation of plenitude. 
ln completing a deficiency, its purpose is to make the 
encyclopedia complete. But in so doing, it also 
reconfigures the encyclopedia as having been deficient, 
because, if not for the supplement, it would have had the 
status of being complete. In this sense, the supplement 
has the connotations ofboth 'plenitude' and 'Jack' and is 
'undecidable.' It makes something deficient in the same 
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moment as it completes it47 • 
Here, the supplement is meant to produce a "complete" individual, the ideal man, who is 
opposed to the species-focused ideal woman. In the attempt to complete the male 
individual, the deficient woman is in tum created. Thus, the supplement cornes to 
represent both the completion and the lack; it is undecidable since it ailows both the 
ideal man and the concept of a supplemented nature to become complete while 
simultaneously rendering the ideal woman as weil as the pure concept of nature 
deficient. When supplemented, nature can produce individuals. 
Several binarities shaped Rousseau's understanding of the ideal man and the ideal 
woman. Consequently, binaries have also shaped my analysis and reconstruction ofhis 
w9rk. Sorne of the binaries l touched upon in this chapter are: nature versus society, 
man versus woman, activity versus passivity, independence versus dependence, 
indifference to others' opinions versus receptivity to others' opinion, intolerance of 
injustice versus tolerance of injustice, and freedom versus restriction. These oppositions 
play prominent roles in the gender norms Rousseau establishes for personality traits and 
socially use fuI skills as weIl as the rewards or punishments he proposes. However, a 
strong undercurrent lurks beneath these binaries: the threat of contamination. Under 
certain conditions, even the most properly educated man or woman may become 
contaminated and faIl short of their ideal. It is to this serious threat that l tum my 
attention in the second chapter. 
47 HT, p. 38. 
" ChaRter Two: The Threat of Contamination 
For Rousseau, culture is 'bad', a degradation from the natural state. Culture is also 
a necessary, remedying supplement both to our (mythicaJ) 'faH' from the natural 
state and to the (mythical) natural state per se (as isolated, pre-linguistic individuals) 
from which we must inevitably 'depart.' 
--Penelope Deutscher, Yielding Gender, p. 105 
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Having examined sorne of the gender norms associated with both the ideal man 
and the ideal woman in the previous chapter, 1 will now offer a more critical appraisal of 
certain aspects of Rousseau's thought. After reiterating the role education is meant to 
serve for humanity, 1 will discuss the impossibility of returning to the state of nature. 1 
will also identify a few of the states of nature or "closer to natural states" that Rousseau 
proposes. 
Rousseau indicates precise moments when the carefully socialised, ideal humans 
may become contaminated or degraded. 1 will examine one example of such an "overt 
threat of contamination": the role a wet nurse plays in a baby's linguistic development48 • 
1 argue that the contamimition present in the case of the wet nurse runs deeper than 
Rousseau realises. Next, in a return to sorne of the textual ex amples 1 addressed in 
chapter one, 1 will analyse certain cases where c'ontamination seems to occur in the text 
without Rousseau acknowledging it or perhaps even without his being aware of il. 
Contamination is ulümately more pervasive than Rousseau may have anticipated and it 
is difficult to fathom a case where something "pure" is not already degraded or holding 
within it the possibility of contamination. In fact, it is quite impossible to determine how 
purity could have ever existed in a huinan uni verse. The structure of our language 
(which in turns shapes how we conceive of the world) is such that no concept and so no 
thing, no person, no place-- in short nothing at all-- could be completely pure of ail 
48 Another case where Rousseau relies on the descriptive as he addresses the wet nurse and not the ideal 
woman. 
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contaminants (ie: its undesirable opposite). With this impossibility in mind, purity as a 
heuristic device, which is also linked to nature as a heuristic device, is not only open to 
skepticism; it also takes on a fanciful and phantasmatic air. 
Lastly, 1 will tum my attention to Rousseau's phantasm, the symbolic and moral 
topography he creates for the ideal man and the ideal woman. His use of metaphor 
shapes his understanding of nature and also encapsulates the incoherencies that make up 
his conception of nature. 
Rousseau's main educational goal is to produce individuals who are socialised in 
a way that remains respectful of nature and the natural dispositions proper to each sex. 
Although he frequently portrays culture as being a contaminating influence upon the 
natural being and the natural order of things, a certain degree of cultural influence allows 
humanity to live in a way that is closer to nature. In this manner, education acts as a 
"cultural amendment [ ... ] which will generate a greater proximity to a social organisation 
supposedly 'ordained by nature'49." A properly controlled and meticulously executed 
exposure to such a "cultural amendment" results in the production ofboth the ideal man 
and the ideal woman, where ide al is not the contrary of "natural" but as close to this 
sense as is possible post facto. Each is subject to a particular and gendered educational 
programme which is meant to allow them to become both"socialised" and "naturalised." 
Paradoxically, education is a matter of "properly denaturing" men and women so that 
the y may more closely resemble their counterparts in the state of nature while still living 
within society. 
Furthermore, the cultural amendment of education is the only viable option 
available to us, since it is impossible to retum to our tr).le origin, the state of nature. Jean 
49 YG, p. 122. 
Starobinski summarises this impossibility as follows: 
La transformation est irréversible; le chemin du retour 
n'est ouvert qu'aux rêveurs. Pour véhément qu'en soit 
le désir, il n'est pas permis de rétrograder. Tout ce qui 
est en notre pouvoir, c'est de réveiller et de garder vive 
la mémoire de l'état de nature50• 
A return to the state of nature is only possible in dreams or a certain memory. Through 
an imaginative or reconstructive memory, we must hold onto the idea of the state of 
nature and use it as a guide for navigating our current social circumstances in the most 
natural way possible; for, having inevitably "fallen" from the state of nature, we can 
only seek to mitigate the contaminating effects of society. Education is thus a cultural 
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process meant to encourage the development of the natural (a concept that, while itself 
formai, has supplanted more abstract notions of the ideal in Rousseau) within both men 
and women. 
The state of nature is meant to be understood as a useful, fictional point of 
reference and not as an empirical, anthropological moment in human history. Rousseau 
tries to use the state of nature narrative as if it were "adequate for acquiring and 
expressing those deep truths about human nature and what kinds of life are best5J ." In 
short, he seems to use the state of nature as a heuristic device. In his work, Rousseau 
does not always use literary devices (narrative, metaphor, etc) as a means of accessing 
what he believes to be fundamental truths. However, in Émile, Rousseau primarily uses 
the state of nature narrative and appeals to the natural man and the natural woman as 
reference points which allows him to name truths about "the natural" as weIl as how the 
ideal man and the ideal woman should be shaped by education. 
If claims can be made aboJ.lt the ideal man and the ideal woman through 
50 TO, p. 344. 
51 LD, p. 33. 
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justifications that rely upon nature, this implies that the state of nature may be more th an 
a simple heuristic device to Rousseau. Although he insists that nature is but a useful 
fiction, he seems to be seduced by his own imaginary narrative; because he bases his 
understanding of men and women as weIl as his entire educational programme on what 
is natural and what is supposed to be respectful of nature, the Rousseauist conception of 
nature thereby becomes more than a useful fiction. As much as Rousseau swears the 
state of nature is but a heuristic device, his use of the concept suggests he-- at least 
occasionally-- believes otherwise. The state of nature does not act as a helpful 
springboard or exemplar for his arguments; it acts as the very foundation of his thought. 
Furthermore, if the state of nature were simply understood as a fiction to which we could 
not possibly retum, the natural foundation upon which Rousseau constructs his 
educational programme would be cast into doubt; why appeal to a concept that we cou Id 
never hope to successfully approximate? The task would be doomed from the start. 
Throughout his corpus, Rousseau repeatedly repositions the state of nature. 
Consequently, what he deems to be a close, "natural-ish" second to the state of nature 
also fluctuates. Before tuming to sorne of the representations of the state ofnature in 
Émile, let us first consider examples drawn from two ofRousseau's other texts: Discours 
sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes and the Essai sur 
l'origine des langues. In the Discours, the state of nature is identified as a time when 
hum ans lived an animalistic life in the forest52• In this state of nature, savage man had no 
language or dwelling and he sought only to satisfy his physical needs. Here, families did 
not exist; men's role in maintaining the species ceased after the sexual act and women 
only tended to the children until they could fend for themselves53 • In contrast, "le barbare 
520F,p.38. 
53 In Discours, it is unclear how long it takes for children to be able to fend for themselves. 
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de l'Essai a une famille, une cabane et une langue, même si elle se réduit au 'geste et à 
quelques sons inarticulés,s4." If primitiveness is gauged by the absence of families, 
lodgirig and language-- in short, social structures and social necessities-- then it would 
seem the state of nature presented in the Discours is more "primitive" than that which is 
outlined in the Essai. The state of nature in the first case seems to be more pure, less 
contaminated by social influence. 1 will question this split between purity and 
contamination shortly. 
One can draw a parallel between the gender norms in the previous chapter and 
the two states of nature 1 just outlined~ The state of nature in the Discours requires a 
great deal of independence; a solitary life in the woods necessitates that such an attribute 
figure prominently in one's constitution. One of the ideal man's main attributes is thus 
independence. Because there is no language of any kind and because humans only 
interact for the purposes of sexual reproduction, there are neither words nor, presumably, 
complex gestures with which to express opinions and no social context in which to voice 
them. In this way, being susceptible to others' opinions becomes impossible; the ideal 
man's indifference to others' opinions echoes the state of nature where opinions were 
irrelevant. Finally, consider pit y in the Discours' state of nature: 
au lieu de cette maxime sublime de justice raisonnée, 
Fais à autrui comme tu veux qu'on te fasse, inspire à 
tous les hommes cette autre maxime de bonté naturelle, 
bien moins parfaite, mais plus utile peut-être que la 
précédente: Fais ton bien avec le moindre. mal d'autrui 
qu'il est possible jj• 
While pit Y is not justice in a lawful sense, it does involve an emotional reaction and a 
sensitivity to the mistreatment and misfortune of others. The natural emotion of pit y 
54 DG, p. 357. 
55 OF, p. 66... 
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permits savage humans to identify and to avoid (or at least to minimise the prevalence 
of) occurrences that are unfair or unjust. For example, "c'est [la pitié] qui détournera tout 
sauvage robuste d'enlever à un faible enfant, ou à un vieillard infirme, sa subsistance 
acquise avec peine56." 
Rousseau broaches the topic of the savage person's pit Y by setting his own 
understanding of the state of nature against the brutish and harsh version put forth by 
Thomas Hobbes. According to Rousseau, Hobbes neglected to consider the innately 
natural feeling of pity which resides within the savage and which mitigates the selfish 
and self-preserving drives57 • Rousseau uses examples drawn from the animal kingdom to 
justify his assertion that pit Y is innate in the savage; consider, for example, that certain 
animaIs are naturally disturbed in the company of their dead kin. Rousseau thereby tries 
to cast pit y in an animalistic light; pit y is something which innately exists in animaIs 
and, because humans are related to animaIs (or, more precisely, in the state of nature we 
were uniquely gifted animaIs, though-- once socialised-- l doubt that Rousseau would 
feel comfortable saying humans are still animaIs), so too does pit y innately exist in 
humans. For Rousseau: Before reason, there is pity. In fact, reason sometimes corrupts 
or compromises one's natural feelings of pit y towards others. So what can be gleaned 
from this natural pity? 
WeIl, l understand natural pit y to be a "proto-intolerance" for injustice which, in 
more socialised contexts, develops into the full-blown intolerance for injustice that the 
ideal man possesses according to Rousseau's gender norms. In short, the ideal man 
reflects the more "primitive" state of nature that was elaborated in the Discours. He is 
said to ~mbody the key traits named as emblematic ofthis fictional time and place. 
56 OF, p. 66. 
57 OF, pp. 63-64. 
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Because the state of nature proposed in the Essai inc1udes families, dependence 
figures more prominently; families are by definition groups of people who rely upon one 
another in various ways. The ideal womàn is said to be quite dependent upon others. In 
this way, the ideal woman seems more c10sely aligned with the particular state of nature 
presented in the Essai. Thanks to language and social units like the family, opinions 
have both a means to be expressed and a forum in which to express them. The ideal 
woman, who is supposed to be sensitive to such opinions, is then able to manifest su ch a 
sensitivity. Finally, since lodging exists in this state of nature, the ideal woman may 
therefore tend to the work of the private sphere: child-rearing and the upkeep of the 
home, for exarnple. The ideal woman becomes associated with a state of nature that is 
less primitive-- less pure-- than the state of nature which seems to value traits associated 
with the ideal man. Man may th en be se en as representing a purer or more original 
nature than that ofwoman58 • She will instead represent a derivative nature, or a non-
nature. It is unc1ear whether Rousseau believes the ideal woman is a derivative nature or 
a non-entity who is so derived or removed from nature that she has no existence except 
as a life-support system in whichever state of nature (however primitive). 
In Émile, Rousseau often refers to other points in time that are not the state of 
nature tout court but which nonetheless serve to imperfectly illustrate sorne of the state 
of nature's characteristics. As 1 mentioned in the previous chapter, Rousseau compares 
the "country context" with the "city context." Although the country context manifests 
many of the social trappings and ills Rousseau wishes to avoid, it does at least fare better 
than the city context. The country context is not as good as the state of nature (which we 
58 The assertion that the ideal woman is more closely aligned to the second state of nature descrïbed here, 
while the ideal man is more closely related to the fIrst is an idea that can be found in a slightly different 
form in Okin 1979, p. 121. 
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cannot retum to anyway, even ifwe wished to do so), but it is preferable to the hyper-
socialised and highly contaminated city context. Rousseau's aim is not that we aIl live 
within the country context. Instead, he refers to the country context to show his readers a 
place where people are doser to their ideal selves than their contaminated, urban 
counterparts. 
Rousseau also uses childhood as a point in time where individuals are generally 
purer (and so, doser to astate of nature) than they are in adulthood. As Starobinski 
emphasises, the innocence of childhood runs parallel to the innocence of the state of 
nature59• Just as the state of nature is meant to represent a time before the contaminating 
effects of society, so too is childhood portrayed as a time preceding the social 
contaminants of adulthood. Again, childhood is not as perfect an example as the state of 
nature, though, like the country context versus the city context, it do es act as an 
excellent counterpoint to adulthood. 
Is any originary point that Rousseau identifies, such as the state of nature, the 
country context, or childhood truly pure? Can such origins really be free from aIl social 
contaminants? Every originary point must in sorne sense be "always already social" 
since sorne constituent element ofthis origin results in the "fall" into a more socialised 
state60 • In fact, Rousseau's conception of nature involves a necessary Jal! or degradation. 
Therefore, nature cannot be understood as wholly (or, arguably, "holy") pure; nature 
must by its very definition contain a "social seed" that leads to its inevitable 
"supplementation by culture61 ." The more primitive state of nature may thus collapse at 
certain points and times into the less primitive state of nature. The rare and mostly 
59 TO, p. 23. 
60 YG, p. 115. 
61 YG,p.l15. 
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sexual interactions between wild individuals may become more frequent and may 
eventually result in the formation of the family such as it is represented in the less 
primitive state of nature. However, the country context cannot be understood without its 
opposite, and the understanding that the country context may with time collapse into the 
city context. The same applies to childhood. As the child grows, the opportunities for the 
chi Id to become a contaminated adult are most plentiful. Deutscher summarises this 
point weIl: 
... every supposedly original state contains the 
possibility of its own loss in the form of its immanent 
degradation or substitution, replacement or 
supplementation. The origin is not autonomous of 
the supplement62 • 
The "social seed" thus waits for the right opportunity to present itself. 1 do not mean to 
imply that this "social seed" has a consciousness. 1 use the term as a way ofunderlining 
how the threat of contamination lives-- i.e., virtuaIly-- within the supposedly pure 
conception of nature, thereby rendering nature structurally impure or less-than-pure from 
the outset, before any supplementation occurs. The origin exists in conjunction with its 
supplementation, and the supplementation persists in a virtual or latent form. 
Remarkably, the not-conscious or impensé here is social; the impensé is usually 
considered as being pre-social or "natural." 
If the natural person or the natural setting contains the possibility of 
contamination, it is also this possibility that renders education feasible. The properly 
educated child and the poorly socialised or "corrupted" chi Id have both had their nature 
supplemented with the cultural amendment of education. In this way, education, or, to 
put it in more broadly, culture, becomes a "necessary evil" that represents "le progrès 
62 HT,p.41. 
comme la possibilité de perversion63." 
What does this imply for the Rousseauist conception of nature? Let us turn to 
Derrida, in the hopes that a textual excerpt may illuminate the issue: 
... la nature ne se supplée point: son supplément ne 
procède pas d'elle-même, ne lui est pas seulement 
inférieur mais autre. Et pourtant toute l'éducation, 
pièce maîtresse de la pensée rousseauiste, sera 
décrite ou prescrite comme un système de suppléance 
destiné à reconstituer le plus naturellement possible 
l'édifice de la nature64• 
Heterogeneous with regard to that to which it is intimately tied, the supplement, any 
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supplement to nature is something which does not actually supplement nature: Le., that 
which it is supposed to supplement. Instead, the supplement stands apart from and 
inferior to nature. Rousseau conceives of education as capable of "reconstituer le plus 
naturellement possible l'édifice de la nature," yet this appears to be a contradiction in 
terms. If supplementation is at a remove from nature, supplementation could not have 
truly natural repercussions in the individual. Or perhaps, the cultural amendment of 
education-- the supplement-- "est l'image et la représentation de la nature. Or l'image 
n'est ni dans ni hors de la nature65." lndividuals who have received the supplement of 
education may represent nature, but their make-up is fundamentally at a remove from 
nature by virtue of the difference of essence of the supplement itself. In the same way 
that différance is, for Derrida, neither presence or absence, the supplement represents 
neither a deficiency nor a plenitude, neither an actuality nor a potentiality. The 
supplement represents both the impossibility ofbeing natural and simultaneously allows 
for that very same possibility to manifest itself. 
63 DG, p. 211 .. 
64 DG, p. 209. 
65 DG, p. 214. 
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Rousseau points out several occasions throughout his educational programme 
where the ideal man and the ideal woman may become contaminated by the negative 
elements of society. Even once one's education is completed, a person's integrity as a 
"properly denatured" being may be corrupted; one must be constantly vigilant against 
the threat of contamination. l will tum my attention to an occasion Rousseau identifies 
as particularly perilous: the baby's first steps towards acquiring language during its first 
education. My analysis will illustrate the uncriticised ambiguities in Rousseau's binary 
logic, and their consequent instability; it will also highlight the burden women are 
called to bear as mediators between natural and social elements. 
It should come as little surprise that Rousseau makes a distinction between a 
language that is natural or original, and a language that springs forth from the social 
realm. The naturallanguage is cornmon to all men and "c'est celle que les enfants parlent 
avant de savoir parler66." This language is not fully articulated in the conventional sense, 
though it is vocal and expressive. 1 understand this natural language as being primarily 
concerned with affectivity; what is said and the particular sounds themselves are less 
important than the emotions expressed through sound. Rousseau offers us another piece 
of information about the naturallanguage and the relationship wet nurses67 have with it: 
66 p.74. 
Les nourrices sont nos maîtres dans cette langue; 
elles entendent tout ce que disent leurs nourrissons; 
elles leur répondent, elles ont avec eux des dialogues 
très bien suivis; et quoiqu'elles prononcent des mots, 
ces mots sont parfaitement inutiles; ce n'est point le 
sens du mot qu'ils entendent, mais l'accent dont il est 
accompagnë8• 
67 As mentioned in the introduction, this is another occasion when some confusion may result from the 
shift from talking about the ideal woman to the wet nurse. In this instance, Rousseau draws from the 
descriptive and discusses wet nurses. 
68 p. 74 .. 
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Wet nurses are the masters of naturallanguage. They listen to everything their babies 
say and they answer their babies too. Wet nurses even carry on "conversations" with 
babies. Although the actual words used by the wet nurseate incomprehensible to the 
baby, the infant does understand the tone [transI. of l'accent] used by the woman. This 
tone lends credence to naturallanguage's affectivity; for example, through tone, the wet 
nurse and the baby may express emotions such as love, joy, perhaps even frustration. 
A few pages later, Rousseau mentions how, since birth, children are exposed to 
what may be referred to as a socialised, or adult, language. Even before babies are able 
to understand what is being said or to imitate the sounds the y hear, adults speak to 
children. Rousseau questions whether babies even have the auditory capacities to 
perceive speech the way adults do. He th en retums to the issue ofwet nurses and the 
development of (social) language: 
Je ne désapprouve pas que la nourrice amuse l'enfant 
par des chahts et des accents très gais et très variés; 
mais je désapprouve qu'elle l'étourdisse incessamment 
d'une multitude de paroles inutiles auxquelles il ne 
comprend rien que le ton qu'elle y met. Je voudrais que 
les premières articulations qu'on lui fait entendre fussent 
rares, faciles, distinctes, souvent répétées et que les mots 
qu'elles expriment ne se rapportassent qu'à des objets 
sensibles qu'on pût d'abord montrer à l'enfant. La 
malheureuse facilité que nous avons à nous payer de mots 
que nous n'entendons pointcommence plus tôt qu'on se 
pense. L'écolier écoute en classe le verbiage de son régent, 
comme il écoutait au maillot le babil de sa nourrice. Il 
me semble que ce serait l'instruire fort utilement que de 
l'élever à n'y rien comprendre69 • 
While it is acceptable for the wet nurse to sing joyful and varied songs to an infant, 
Rousseau disapproves of the wet nurse who speaks incessantly to a baby. After aIl, the 
baby will understand only the tone of her speech and not its content. Rousseau would 
69 EE, pp. 81-82. 
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prefer that the baby's first exposure to social language consist in the simple and repeated 
naming of concrete objects that are presented to the child. This would thereby prec1ude 
instilling in the child a receptivity to speech that is beyond his understanding; such a 
receptivity or passivity is associated with an educational system where teachers subject 
their students to lectures which are beyond their comprehension. In short, exposing a 
baby to social language exposes himlher to a myriad of ideas and words that have little 
or nothing to do with "reallife" (ie: concrete experience). Acquiring language takes us 
away from a more natural existence where a language of affectivity and a tangible 
reality predominate; Rousseau would like to delay this as long as possible and avoid first 
crowding the baby's mind with a (social) language that has little to do the "real world." 
---It would be a prudent step to first establish whether the wet nurse is in fact 
engaging with the child in the same way in both textual excerpts. In the first case, the 
wet nurse understands the child's vocalisations yet responds with words from the social, 
or adult, language. She cannot completely retum to the naturallanguage; she can only 
. '/eproduce its key affective tone in the language of adults. Therefore, although the chi Id 
\. 
does not comprehend the meaning ofthese words (and thus, the words themselves are 
characterised as useless), slhe does seem to understand the tone in which the words are 
spoken. In the second case, the wet nurse uses the same "paroles inutiles auxquelles 
[l'enfant] ne comprend rien que le ton qu'elle y met." lndeed, in both cases, the wet nurse 
responds to the chi Id by using words whose meanings are incomprehensible; the child is 
, 
only able to make sense of the wet nurse's tone of voice (ie: her expressions of 
affectivity). 
Rousseau's opinions of the wet nurse's role here are mixed. On one hapd, he 
values that she is able to communicate affectively with the child. On the other, he 
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devalues her work because she is also slowly taking the baby away from natural, purely 
affective communication. She both understands what is most important (affective 
communication) and encourages the baby's exit from such a natural, linguistic state. 
Rather than drawing upon a contemporary understanding of how language is 
acquired by children, 1 choose to focus upon how contamination (which equals adult 
language or, more broadly, culture) figures quite prominently in pure, naturallanguage 
as well as in the course for language acquirement proposed by Rousseau. 
Arguably, naturallanguage contains certain building blocks of the adult 
language. Once the baby has moved past simple gurgling or cooing, the sounds slhe 
makes are imitative of the adult language; they rely on a mixture of vowel and consonant 
sounds to express affectivity. The child masters neither the correct form nor the meaning 
of the words, but slhe seizes upon a few of the basic components of spoken, adult 
language. In this way, the contamination of adult language exists within the supposedly 
naturallanguage. 
Rousseau proposes that, as the first step towards acquiring language, babies 
should be shown objects and informed of the object's name. Presumably, a baby would 
see the object, hear a word spoken by an adult and be able to associate the vocalisation 
(or word) to its corresponding meaning. However, ifbabies are incapable ofknowing the 
meàning ofwords in a general way, how could they then leam the meaning ofwords 
through such an association? If the words themselves hold no meaning to a baby, it 
becomes impossible to attribute meaning by associating sounds and objects. Conversely, 
if babies are capable of succeeding thanks to Rousseau's proposed course of action, this 
implies that babies possess a predisposition towards acquiring adult language. Yet again, 
the social seed lurks within what it intended to be pure, or aH natural. 
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The case ofnatural language and the wet nurse highlights how women are the 
site of tension between oppositionalities such as nature versus culture. The wet nurse is 
said to be a master of the naturallanguage; she is supposed to understand what the baby 
is saying. She is thus affiliated to nature by virtue of this alleged understanding. That 
said, it is questionable if she truly is a master of the naturallanguage. She may 
understand the child, but she responds in the adult, or social, language. Were her 
mastery of the naturallanguage complete, she would be able to express herself with it as 
weIl. Were she familiar exclusively with the social language, she would be incapable of 
knowing what the child was saying. The wet nurse straddles the opposition between the 
two languages, representing neither wholly. 
In this way, and others, Rousseau develops the phantasm of nature which guides 
his thought. The Rousseauist phantasmatic uni verse is one in which man is nature, 
action, independence and thus a heartier manifestation of the natural. Woman becomes 
nature too, but derivatively. Nature cannot consist only ofpassivity and tasks related to 
the survival of the species (such as breeding and child-rearing); these are the kinds of 
traits and skills at which the ideal woman excels. This split between a "he art y" nature 
and a derived nature echoes the split between the more primitive state of nature and the 
1ess primitive one. The idea1 man is more c1ose1y associated with the first state, just as 
he represents a "heartier" manifestation of nature by virtue of his affiliation with action, 
independence, etc. The ideal woman is associated with the second, or familial state of 
nature and she represents a lessvigorous, more passive nature by virtue ofher affiliation 
with domestic obligations. The ideal woman's nature is derivative, but it is still 
necessary. Rousseau's phantasm of nature is intemally complex: what counts as natural 
differs for each sex, and each variation could not exist in society without the support of 
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the other. 
The topography of Rousseau's phantasm is divided in two. On one side, there is 
the ideal man. On the other side, there is the ideal woman. Each are subject to their own 
rules of incarnation for what it means to be natural. The ideal personality, the correct 
skills, and the proper morality differ between them. What is best for the ideal woman is 
not what is best for the ideal man and vice versa. The worst that the ideal man can be is 
"less worse" than the worst an ideal woman can be. The highs and lows for each sex 
follow differing logics; each sex may reach different peaks and valleys, as it were. The 
individual who transgresses the gendered limits of the topography is perhaps the very 
worst of aIl cases; each sex must remain within his or her gendered guidelines, lest 
further degeneracy ensue. l will retuin to the issue of this division based on sexual 
difference. 
We cannot retum to the state of nature; though nature-- as a heuristic device--
profoundly shapes the terrain of Rousseau's phantasmatic topography, retuming to a 
natural state is a foreclosed possibility. The faU from nature is unavoidable; a retum, 
while perhaps dreamed ofby sorne, is impossible. Consequently, men and women must 
respect and obey the gender-specific guidelines set forth by Rousseau; doing so is the 
only way humans can become something better than corrupted and improperly denatured 
creatures. Rumans cannot go back to being their truly natural selves (as they existed in 
whichever state of nature Rousseau pinpointed). Instead, according to Rousseau's logic, 
humanity must move forward in a way that is as reminiscent of "the natural" as possible. 
Without this forward-movement, it is like1y that the social corruption and contamination 
'Y0uld increase further; it is for "our own good" that everyone must follow their gender-
specific guidelines. 
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Nature, though it is meant to act as a guiding theoretical principle, "reçoit une 
évidence presque concrète, par la vertu d'un langage qui sait donner à l'imaginaire tous 
les caractères de la présence7o." Metaphors which guide Rousseau's reflection on nature 
seduce the reader (and quite possibly Rousseau himself, as 1 suggested earlier) into 
believing such a conception of nature actually exists; with the help of metaphors and a 
literary style, the imaginary évidence is imbued with an illusory presence (or reality). 
Although such metaphoric stylings are meant to give credence to his assertions, upon 
further analysis, these metaphors and literary elements introduce contradictions into the 
text. 1 will encourage the interaction between a prescription and a metaphor mentioned 
in my first chapter: the requirement that a girl become accustomed to a limited freedom 
and the metaphor that equates the ideal woman with the earth (ie: the soil). 
Girls may experience a period of adaptation in the face of limits being placed 
upon their freedom. At first, girls may complain or offer resistance to such limits. 
Rousseau maintains that one must simply enforce the restriction until the girl's behaviour 
mirrors her natural inclination to require such a limitation. While natural, limits to her 
freedom arid the related concept of her servitude require initial enforcement for the 
natural inclination to prosper. Then, according to this logic, would the African-American 
slaves of the early United States have.also had their "natural inclination towards 
servitude and a limited freedom" initially enforced? Both arguments are essentialist, but 
the second case is more unsettling to contemplate and more likely to emphasise the 
absurdity inherent to such claims. 
Later in the text, Sophie is characterised as being "une terre bien préparée qui 
n'attend que le grain pour rapporter7l ." The ideal woman, Sophie, and the embodiment of 
70 TO, p. 345. 
71 EE,p.538. 
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the female element is thus metaphorically associated with fertile soil. The female ideal is 
represented as the "incarnation" of the Earth: a passive, inertial entity, rich in nutrients, 
that supports other forms of life. How then can we explain the "earthy" girl's acting out 
against a limited freedom? It is contradictory to assert both that girls would act out and 
that the female is fertile soil. 
Before reaching puberty, girls are more "hermaphroditic." They do not exist as 
fully female; instead, girls may exist as a mix of both sexes. If girls were completely 
female, they would not go through a period of adaptation. Their natural inclinations 
towards a limited freedom would result in immediate acceptance of su ch limitations. 
Alternatively, even if the girls wished to act out in response, they would be unable to do 
so because their inertial earthiness would prevent it. They wou Id be too passive and 
nurturing to pursue such a rebellious act. Through this particular lens, girls' acting out is 
understood as the product of the active, male element of their hermaphroditism. Boys 
resist having their freedom restricted; so too would girls who have not yet experienced 
puberty. 
Another way of explaining this contradiction is in the assertion that girls do not 
grasp their essence as easily or as distinctly as boys do. Since the ideal woman is a 
mixed-thing, it may be more difficult for girls to realise what the make-up of their 
natural essence is. AIso, boys may seize upon their essence more easily because 
considerable responsibility and jouissance accompany it. Boys will eventually act within 
the public sphere, participate in politics and be the patriarch of a household. They will 
occupy themselves with educating their mate as weIl. With the responsibilities cornes 
great and repeated opportunities for jouissance. 
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How might the ideal woman's "hermaphroditism" (her straddling or shifting back 
and forth between the two halves of Rousseau's gendered divide) relate to Rousseau's 
phantasmatic topography? To answer this, let us examine one of the main material 
metaphoric qualities of Rousseau's phantasm of nature: the concepts of fluidity and 
solidity. The ideal man is solid and the ideal woman is fluid. For example, the ideal man 
is impermeable (or "sol id") in the face of others' opinions. In contrast, the ideal woman 
is "fluid" in response to others' opinions; she may be influenced. This metaphoric 
topography looks deceptively simple, though further examination will reveal its inherent 
complexity. 
Liquids are active in the sense that they change their shape to suit their 
environment. Consider a beverage assuming the dimensions of a tumbler, or a stream 
squeezing through crevices in a pile of rocks. The ideal woman, in tum, is active by 
virtue of her flexibility and adaptability. She will bend and flow according to male 
wishes. Even though the female is associated with passivity, here we see how action is a 
key component of the ideal woman's fluidity. In this sense, she is capable of more 
flexibility and adaptation than her soli d, male counterpart. 
In fact, the ideal woman's fluidity is quite necessary for her survival. Were she to 
be more "solid," she would risk facing the sanctions 1 mentioned in the first chapter. 
Should she fail to exemplify her gender norms (in which fluidity plays a prominent role), 
she might lose her husband, her children and her good-standing in the public's eye72• 
These consequences are disastrous and could lead to impoverishment, abandonment, or 
injury. The ideal woman must be pliable and adaptable. In short, she is forced to be that 
way. Since it is bom out of such an urgent necessity"her fluidity is perceived as being 
72 EE, p. 48. 
48 
both absurd and morally right. It is absurd because the ideal man would never be 
reduced to such fluidity; his nature could never tolerate such a thing, though her nature 
can and should tolerate it. Curiously enough, adaptability or fluidity is not a positive 
attribute. Rer fluidity is morally right because the ideal woman is meant to be dependent 
on and to be of service to the ide al man. And her fluidity facilitates the existence of such 
a heterosexual relationship. 
As previously stated, the concept of nature is not unitary; it has no integrity in 
and of itself. This point was suggested in the previous chapter when 1 asserted that there 
was no way to conceive of the ideal man as not already being whole in and ofhimself; 
the supposed complementarity of two "halved" sexes disintegrated as a consequence. 
AIso, nature has two distinct teloi: one for the ideal woman, the other for the ideai man .. 
The fragmentation of the concept of nature is underlined again within Rousseau's 
phantasmatic topography because the ideal woman frequentIy inhabits both sides of 
topography, despite the rule that neither sex wander into in the opposite sex's 
topography. 
The ideal woman manifests traits that exist on both the male and female side of 
the topographical divide. She is, of course, passive, life-producing and life-sustaining; 
dependent on her husband, she tends to the home and the propagation of the species. 
Rowever, in certain instances, the ideal woinan is also called to be active, the polar 
opposite of the passivity she is said to exhibit. 
Perhaps the best example of such an instance involves the first education of the 
children. The ideal woman must lactate and breastfeed her child73, but she must also 
73 This would he Rousseau's prescription. Once again, we witness the textual contradictions brought 
about by Rousseau's prescription that ideal women should breastfeed their own children coupled wÎth 
his awareness that most women in the eighteenth century who were in the middle- and upper-classes 
hired wet nurses. 
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possess enough activity and insight to guide the child through this critically important 
first education. In this way, the ideal woman illustrates the complexity and composite 
constitution of a less pure nature, which Rousseau takes for every bit as "concrete" as 
the primordial one. Rather th an marking a distinct split between the binary of passivity 
and activity, here nature seems to require both parts of the dichotomy to function 
properly. The ideal woman, in order to be natural, must-- in a move that becomes 
"perversely unnatural and natural"-- possess traits from both the male and female sides 
of the topography. This is a perversion since each sex is supposed to remain within its 
gendered topographical confines; the ideal woman cannot respect this obligation. 
Nevertheless, this transgression should also be understood as in sorne sense "natural" 
because paradoxically the woman must, in order to be natural, tend to the children's first 
education (which requires both her passivity and activity). 
Rousseau may seek to minimise the importance of the ideal woman's role in the 
first, or natural, education. Proof of this may be. found in the structure of the text itself. 
Although he addresses himselfto a "tendre et prévoyante mère" in the body of the text, 
he mentions that the first education belongs to women in a lengthy footnote74 • While he 
claims to speak to mothers themselves, the explicitation of her task appears to be 
somewhat of an aside in the text. H is literally a footnote to a larger narrative. 
While Rousseau may wish that the ideal woman's involvement in the first 
education remain a "lesser social activity," su ch a wish is undone by many of his other 
assertions. Namely, he maintains that the ideal woman is more sociable than the ideal 
man. She is thoroughly invested in and dependent upon her family. She is receptive to 
others' opinions and she cares about her appearance. AlI of these traits align her with 
74 EE, p. 35 n X. 
other human beings and with the social realm. Because Rousseau associates the ideal 
woman with the social realm, her participation in the first education must be seen as 
significant and social. 
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This brings us to another aspect of Rousseau's metaphorical topography. While 
the ideai man is supposed to be c10ser to the more pure state of nature, he is aiso meant 
to be active in politics. The ideal woman, on the other hand, is c10ser to a derivative 
form ofnature and is meant to stay away from politics. However, an analysis ofboth 
sexes' corresponding traits reveals that perhaps each is unsuited to the task to which they 
were assigned. 
With her receptivity to others' opinions, her undeniable involvement with others, 
her fluidity, and her concem for appearances, the ideal woman may be able to act more 
effectively in politics than the ideal man. In contrast, the ideal man with his 
independence and indifference to others' opinions may hold himself too far apart from 
others to succeed in politics, much less to perpetuate a working democratic space of 
debate and negotiation. The ideal man has an intolerance for injustice which, 
presumably, is meant to help him in politics. Of course, the ideal woman does not 
possess such a trait. However, it is worth noting that-- thankfully for Rousseau-- she 
does have a tolerance to injustice committed against her. 
Aristotle conceived of justice as being a "mean state75." The task then is to find 
the just mean that is mindful of the status ofthose individuals involved and which also 
represents neither a deficiency nor an excess of justice. If justice is thus framed, the ideal 
man may seem to better understand such a conception due to his intolerance for 
injustice. Howeyer, were his intolerance complete, would it not extend towards the ideal 
75 NE, p. 76. 
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woman? If his intolerance for injustice were wholly manifested, he would perceive the 
injustices suffered by the ideal woman and would seek out the just mean. Instead he too 
possesses an intolerance for injustice committed against himself and a tolerance for 
injustice endured by others, namely the ideal woman. Given such a reprehensible 
tolerance for injustice-- or worse, a willful ignorance of injustice when it is personally 
beneficial-- the ideal man imperfectly realises his supposed intolerance for injustice and 
thereby throws into doubt his efficacy as a political agent. 
Furthermore, the ideal man may be too consumed by the project of maintaining 
his own autonomy from others. Independence, indifference, and metaphorical solidity 
compromise the social drive; thus they also compromise his political effectiveness. This 
possibility contradicts the phantasmatic topography which aligns the ideal man with 
politics and a pure nature, and the ideal woman with a derived nature and the private 
sphere. 
A final, fundamental element of Rousseau's phantasmic topography is his belief 
in the existence of two ontologically distinct and essentially separated sexes. Sexual 
difference is thus of utmost importance to Rousseau; it shapes his educational 
programme just as it shapes, with the dualistic Nature he relies on, his phantasmatic 
topography. It marks the most basic division in both his educational programme and in 
his phantasmatic topography. Should one ever wish to apply or relate either to one's self, 
the logical question one would ask before doing so is: What sex am I? From this first 
division, aIl other acceptable traits and skills will follow. 
A theoretical move that has historicaIly been important to feminist thought is 
distinguishing one's sex from one's gender. Sex consisted in bodily attributes that were 
said to be specific to aparticular sex. For example, the female sex would be determined 
52 
by the presence ofbreasts and female reproductive organs. The male sex would be 
determined by the male reproductive organs. Gender, on the other hand, reflected the 
traits and skills associated via culture to a particular sex. For example, the female gender 
is associated with emotionality, whereas the male gender is associated with rationality. 
The division between sex and gender has proved useful for feminists and 1 do not intend 
to minimise its importance or its continued presence today. However, more recently, the 
lines between sex and gender have been blurred76. In fact, the static and originary nature 
of the body has been put into question; it is to this idea that 1 focus my attention. 
Judith Butler has argued that sexual difference "is never simply a function of 
material differences which are not in sorne way both marked and formed by discursive· 
practices 77." By this she does not mean that discourse causes sexual difference, but that 
discourse (Le., conceptuality, textuality, gesturality in a host of contexts) cannat be 
separatedfram sexual difference. By combining the material reality of the body with a 
discourse that decides "what counts" as determining a given sex, sexual difference is 
produced and reproduced: 
And there will be no way to understand 'gender' as 
a cultural construct which is imposed upon the surface 
of matter, understood either as 'the body' or its given 
sex. Rather, onee 'sex' itself is understood in hs 
normativity, the materiality of the body will not be 
thinkable apart from the materialization of that 
regulatory norm. 'Sex' is, thus, not simply what one 
has, or a statie description of what one is: it will be 
one of the norms by whieh the 'one' beeomes viable 
at aH, that whieh qualifies a body for life within the 
domain of cultural intelligibility78. 
Sex becomes a norm that imposes itselfupon the body and permits the individual to gain 
76 Perhap5 m05t notably 50 by Judith Butler in Gender Trouble (see bibliography). 
77 BM, p. ]. 
78 BM, p. 2. 
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"cultural intelligibility." Sex thereby becomes one of the ways a person becomes a 
(social) person, so to speak. If sex is produced through the chiasm of bodies and 
discursive practices, it is not something which is static or pre-cultural (natural in a 
Rousseauian, originary sense). In this light, the foundational and essential sexual 
division proposed by Rousseau loses credibility; sexual difference as mere biological 
difference is itself a phantasm. The very structure of his phantasmatic topography falters 
under this view without the assurance of the pre-cultural (natural) existence of two 
essentially opposed sexes, one ofwhich is a mixed thing, passive and passive-active. For 
our ends, however, this permits an exploration of the phantasm, as no philosophy--
perhaps no social group-- can legitimate and perpetuate itself without a narrative that is 
grounded on a foundational phantasm. 
The necessity of such a phantasm is given further credence by Derrida's analysis 
of Rousseau's necessary reliance upon onanism. The contradictory role of the 
"dangerous supplement" is summarised as follows: 
il conduit le désir hors du bon chemin, il fait errer loin 
des voies naturelles, le mène vers sa perte ou sa chute et 
c'est pourquoi il est une sorte de lapsus ou de scandale. 
Il détruit ainsi la nature. Mais le scandale de la raison, 
c'est que rien ne semble plus naturel que cette destruction 
de la nature 79." 
Auto-eroticism tums desire's focus away from a suitable female mate; in this way, it 
represents a loss, a scandalous moving-away from the natural object of desire. Nature is 
obliterated in this moving-away, yet it is also reaffirmed for what could be more natural 
than supplementing the natural? Although onanism is "vécue dans l'angoisse80" because 
it exposes Rousseau to the possibilities of castration, madness and death, he cannot set 
79 DG, p. 216. 
80 DG, p. 216, 
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aside the practice and the presences he conjures up in his imagination. Rousseau "ne 
peut renoncer à ce qui lui restitue immédiatement l'autre présence désirée; pas plus qu'on 
peut renoncer au langage8l ." In fact, his use of onanism persists even though auto-
affection is cause for considerable frustration as weil. For, no matter how detailed or 
realistic his conjurings, the imagined (and so absent) presence is but an illusion: "S'y 
promet en s'y dérobant, s'y donne en s'y déplaçant quelque chose qu'on ne peut même 
appeler rigoureusement présence82." The supplement is maddening; while the 
imagination brings to life a "non-presence," the lack inherent to such imaginings is 
obvious. The imaginary presence is present and absent; by the same movement, it is 
both. 
The supplement is a terrifying menace, yet it is also the best protection against 
just such a menace. However, although Rousseau deems it to be peiilous, the dangerous 
supplement is better than the alternative: cohabitation with women83 • Yes, it is a 
perversion. It destroys nature just as it asserts nature. It threatens Rousseau with 
castration, madness, death and frustration. It is a gesture which simultaneously gives and 
takes away the possibilities of presence, and nature. It is profoundly dangerous, but it is 
also profoundly preferable to-- and likely more satisfying than-- the "real thing" (ie: 
sexual entanglement with a woman, and the related possibility of embodying the truly 
natural). 
How then will Derrida's analysis of Rousseau and onanism aid in the 
understanding of Rousseau's pharitasm as it has been elaborated in this work? Like the 
phantasmatic topography and its most basic sexual division, onanism is absolutely 
81 DG, p. 221. 
82 DG, p. 222, 
83 DG, p. 223, 
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necessary even though it undoes itselfjust as it asserts itself. Most importantly, onanism 
troubles the notion of an originary, natural form. A natural desire for a woman is deemed 
to be riskier than the admittedly dangerous supplement of onanism. The rightness and 
inflexibility ofwhat is natural is thereby troubled; the "post-natural" (ie: the social, the 
supplement) is in fact deemed to be better than the natural. Much as the idea ofthere 
being two pre-cultural, distinct and opposed sexes is a foundational component of 
Rousseau's phantasm, so too is his conception of nature. With every act of 
supplementation, Rousseau's authorship simultaneously undermines and asserts this 
particular foundational phantasm of nature. The foundational phantasm as weIl as its 
necessary supplementation cannot be surrendered-- just as the language which permits 
and enacts such complexities and incoherencies never be surrendered. 
1 will address one final issue conceming Rousseau's phantasmatic topography: 
his descriptions of natural characteristics and identities. The traits and skills he maps out 
reflect his own society. For example, the woman is in the private sphere, financially and 
emotionally dependent upon her husband; this was the case for women of a certain 
social class in Rousseau's time. As such, the roles and traits assigned to the ideal woman, 
as necessities within the larger logic of "the natural," become a phantasm. Additionally, 
although Rousseau often refers to the country context, it is unclear whether he had any 
significant contact with peasants or country life. This lack of clarity gives me pause. 
What experiences, be they lived or theoretical (that is, drawn from a text), does 
Rousseau use to justify his affection and valuation of the country context? 1 fail to see 
how his discussions and his qualified praise of the country context could be anything but 
a phantasm. 
Chapter Three: Purity, Sex, and Socialisation 
Comment ne voit-on pas qu'avec une si grande inégalité dans la mise commune, 
si la réserve n'imposait à l'un la modération que la nature impose à l'autre, il en 
résulterait bientôt la ruine de tous deux, et que le genre humain périrait par les 
moyens établis pour le conserver? 
--Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile, p. 467 
Although he understood it to be necessary and important, Rousseau did not 
thoroughly embrace heterosexual sex84. Within heterosexual couplings, he saw the 
possibility of ruin on either a large or small scale (for the species or for the two parties 
involved)85. Through his discussion of sexual relations in Émile, many of the ideas 1 
have previously mentioned are at play: namely, the contaminating influence of the 
public sphere, the comparative purity of the private sphere, the conception of man and 
woman that marks them as polar opposites, the marital unit as forming a co-dependent 
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wh6le of two halves, and the woman playing the role of mediator between nature and 
society. The seduction game that occurs between the ideal man and the ideal woman 
echoes these concems. The notions which are of primary importance to Rousseau 
resonate throughout his consideration of sexual relations. "Seduction game" is a term 1 
have chosen to refer to the series of sexual advances and refusaIs that are supposed to 
occur between the ideal man and the ideal woman; Rousseau believes this tension, this 
seduction game, to be quite essential to heterosexual couplings. Because the ideas 
Rousseau holds most dear are visible within his treatment ofheterosexual sex, the play 
ofbinaries in Rousseau's thought and, arguably, the critical aspect ofthese matrices of 
84 Once more, 1 believe it is necessary to highlight that Rousseau considers only the possibility of 
heterosexual couplings; sex between one man and one woman is the only sort of sex he deems to be 
'natural.' 
85 This possibility ofruin on a personal or grand scale is echoed in the excerpt at the beginning of the 
chapter. It is echoed too in the Discours: "Parmi les passions qui agitent le cœur de l'homme, il en est 
une ardente, impétueuse, qui rend un sexe nécessaire à l'autre, passion terrible qui brave tous les 
dangers, renverse tous les obstacles, et qui dans ses fureurs semble propre à détruire le genre humain 
qu'elle est destinée à conserver" (OF, p. 67). 
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oppositions are highlighted. Of course, the amplification also underlines the instability 
of su ch matrices. I will outline the ways in which the ideas mentioned above manifest 
themselves in Rousseau's discussion of sexual relations. 
Why is it important to discuss sexual relations as they are presented in Émile? 
Sex as sexuality and as coupling plays a key role in the ideal man's development. Sexual 
entanglement (which must necessarily occur within the confines the heterosexual marital 
unit) acts as the ideal man's final andfull introduction to society. It is through sexuality 
(and thereby also marriage) that the ideal man is in sorne sense fully "socialised" or 
brought into c10ser contact with society. The ideal woman, by virtue ofher strong ties to 
domestic and species-related concems like child-bearing and child-rearing, is more 
social than her male counterpart. Ideal women are therefore called to act as "the agents 
of men's socialisation86." This is a critical step in the ideal man's educational programme. 
Although he has been taught to embody his natural traits and skills, he must also exist 
within a society: "Émile n'est pas fait pour rester toujours solitaire; membre de société, il 
en doit remplir les devoirs87 ." It is necessary to introduce Émile, the ideal man, to 
society. The best way of doing this involves finding a mate that is worthy ofhim. The 
précepteur, or Rousseau's authorship, summarises this element as follows: 
Ton coeur, dis-je au jeune homme, a besoin d'une compagne; 
allons chercher celle qui te convient: nous ne la trouverons 
pas aisément peut-être, le vrai mérite est toujours rare; mais 
ne nous pressons ni ne nous rebutons point. Sans doute il en 
est une et nous la trouverons à la fin, ou du moins celle qui 
en approche le plus. Avec un projet si flatteur pour lui je 
l'introduis dans le mondé8• 
The ideal man is introduced to society (le monde) via the "projet flatteur" offinding him 
86 SP, p. 6. 
87 EE, p. 429. 
88 EE, p. 430. My emphasis. 
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a suitable mate. Such a mate would be the ideal woman, or at least a woman who closely 
resembles her ideal. The search for a mate willlikely be a difficult task, but the 
précepteur is optimistic about its eventual outcome. Through the ideal woman (or a 
reasonable approximation thereof), the ideal man will become sociable (or socialised). 
Relatedly, "being found" is the first moment oftrue significance in the ideal woman's 
life. In fact, aIl of her informaI education up until that point was in preparation of her 
becoming the ideal man's wife; before she may fulfill her natural telos ofProtgating ez-/ 
the species, she must achieve a related telos that must preceed breeding: becoming a 
wife. Because of the key role finding a mate plays in the development of both the ideal 
man and the ideal woman, it becomes essential to give these issues sorne consideration. 
Of course, the agent of socialisation should be the life partner of the ideal man; 
an ideal man should certainly not seek out a feminine, socialising influence through sex 
that occurs outside of the confines of marriage. It is only with a worthy woman who 
properly manifests her natural selfthat the ideal man (who also properly manifests his 
natural self thereby) shoUld seek to become socialised through sex and its necessary 
precursor: marriage. Sex that occurs outside of this acceptable context would not have a 
socialising effect; it is not so mu ch the sexual act itself that socialises; instead, it would 
be better to understand sexual desire and ils related seduction strategies as having a 
socialising influence upon the ideal man. Sexual desire, or the heterosexual male "pull" 
towards a woman, as weIl as the seduction game played by the woman are what have the 
socialising influence. 
Before proceeding, 1 wish to quickly sketch the key differences between what 1 
calI (the more natural) "sexual need" and (the more socialised) "sexual desire." Though 
Rousseau will use the term "desire" when referring to cases that follow what 1 calI 
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"sexual need" and "sexual desire," 1 believe it is beneficial to conceive of desire as 
something which shaped by social influences and therefore irrelevant to the case of 
"sexual need." Consider the following excerpt from the Discours as a means of engaging 
this distinction: 
Commençons par distinguer le moral du physique dans 
le sentiment de l'amour. Le physique est ce désir général 
qui porte un sexe à s'unir à l'autre; le moral est ce qui 
détermine ce désir et le fixe sur un seul object 
exclusivement, ou qui du moins lui donne pour cet objet 
préféré un plus grand degré d'énergie. Or, il est facile de 
voir que le moral de l'amour est un sentiment factice né 
de l'usage de la société ... 89 
Although Rousseau splits the concept of love into its physical and moral pieces, 1 find 
the use of the term of "love" for both cases to be confusing. Romantic love (in the sense 
of a deep affection, understanding, and commitment for a partner of the opposite sex90) 
does not actually exist in the first case; with that in mind, 1 prefer to differentiate 
between the two by calling the first sexual need, and the second sexual desire (which is a 
sexual need that must be accompanied by romantic love and other "artificial" social 
customs). In the Discours, Rousseau maintains that the sexual need would occur fairly 
infrequently because it would not be augmented by social elements such as love, 
disagreements with other male suitors, and imagination. Sexual need is thus a physical, 
urgent, yet easily sated need: "chacun attend paisiblement l'impulsion de la nature; s'y 
livre sans choix, avec plus de plaisir que de fureur; et, le besoins satisfait, tout le désir 
est éteint91 ." 
Sexual desire,· on the other hand, is the physical need complicated and amplified 
by romantic love, the requirement ofmonogamy, and social practices (namely, marriage 
89 OF, p. 68. 
90 Rousseau's heterononnativity is at play again here. 
91 OF, p. 68. 
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and its related seduction game). The ideal man is directed to avoid the sexual services of 
prostitutes, even though he will be inc1ined to sate himself sexually before finding his 
lifemate (Sophie)92. It is also said that "si [les] désirs [de l'homme idéal] l'entraînent vers 
le sexe, il n'y trouve point ce qu'il cherche, et son cœur préoccupé le retient93." The ideal 
man is thus seeking not only the physical act of sex; he seeks also romantic love (which 
must in turn be accompanied by marriage). 
While 1 will not address in great detail what Rousseau understood to be love, 1 
will say that it seems to be highly romanticised (and so likely impossible) in its 
requirements of total understanding and openness between a màn and a woman94 • N.J.H. 
Dent neatly summarised the romantic love (as it is explained in Émile) as follows: "In 
su ch intimate personal [romantic] love, the lover is skinlessly exposed in all his hopes 
and fears, his sense of himself and what he means, to the return of his loved one to him 
and to his love95 ." The expression "skinlessly exposed" (while, in my case, it conjures up 
the unappetising image ofraw chicken breasts) highlights the exceptionally great 
intimacy and openness that is supposed to come with romantic love (and so also with 
sexual desire). It is doubtful if such a love could truly manifest itself; a dissatisfaction 
with romantic love and subsequent efforts to supplement it may be found in sorne of 
Rousseau's autobiographical writings. That said, and with the concepts of"sexual need" 
and "sexual desire" sketched in their broadstrokes, 1 must now put aside further 
discussion on the subject ofromantic love in favour ofreturning to the issue at hand: 
heterosexual couplings between the ideal man and the ideal woman. Though romantic 
love plays a role in sexual desire, 1 will focus exc1usively upon heterosexual couplings 
92 EE, p. 432. 
93 EE, p. 433. 
94 Again, 1 feel compelled to point out the heteronormativity inherent to this romantic love. 
95 RI, p. 152. . 
61 
(as, according to Rousseau, they are meant to occur within a context ofmarried, 
heterosexual, romantic love). 
It is through sexua1 desire that the ideal man is made aware of his relation to the 
species. Although the ideal woman has consistently been affiliated with her species and 
with her sex, it is only through (married, heterosexual) sex that the ideal man-- the 
individual par excellence-- cornes to feel an affiliation with his species. As established in 
chapter one, the ideal man will only be his sex (or, in other words, feel affiliated to his 
species) at certain moments in his life such as when he is sexually desirous or sexually 
engaged. His sense ofbeing a member of the species is centred around his sexuality and 
his reproductive organs. 
How, then, are sexual relations negotiated between the ideal man and the ideal . 
woman? Let us refer to the advice given by the précepteur to Sophie: 
Vous régnerez longtemps par l'amour, si vous rendez vos 
faveurs rares et précieuses, si vous savez les faire valoir. 
Voulez-vous voir votre mari sans cesse à vos pieds, tenez-le 
toujours à quelque distance de votre personne. Mais, dans 
votre sévérité, mettez de la modestie, et non du caprice; 
qu'il vous voie réservée, et non pas fantasque; gardez qu'en 
ménageant son amour vous ne le fassiez douter du vôtre. 
Faites-vous chérir par vos faveurs et respecter par vos refus; 
qu'il honore la chasteté de sa femme sans avoir à se plaindre 
de sa froideur96 • 
The ideal woman must withhold sex, but not 50 much that she may ferceived as being r 
frigid. She must give sex to her mate but also periodically refuse so that, when she does 
consent, it is a precious gift. By refusing to be sexually receptive aIl the time, she 
thereby exerts a certain degree of power over the ideal man. She guarantees that her 
husband will remain interested in her. 
96 EE, p. 627. 
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Regardless ofwhether the ideal woman is desirous ofher mate, "elle [ ... ] 
repousse [l'homme] et se défend toujours, mais non pas toujours avec la même force, ni 
par conséquent avec le même succès97." The seduction game requires that she resist; this 
resistance camouflages whether she desires him or if she is only submitting to his desire: 
Alors ce qu'il y a de plus doux pour l'homme dans sa 
victoire est de douter si c'est la faiblesse qui cède à la 
force, ou si c'est la volonté qui se rend; et la ruse 
ordinaire de la femme est de laisser toujours ce doute 
entre elle et lui98• 
The ideal man, celebrating a sexual victory, greatly enjoys not knowing ifhis mate is 
willfully consenting to sex, or not99• The ideal woman is complicit in his doubt; she 
never reveals wh ether she was forced to acquiesce or if she truly wanted to have sex. 
This mystery ought to be maintained as it is part of what makes the ideal woman so 
attractive to the ideal man: the effacement or the non-èxistence of her sexual desire. 
Thankfully, su ch a ruse suits her weIl: "loin de rougir de leur faiblesse, [les femmes] en 
font gloire lOo." She delights in both her physical weakness, and her weakness in 
surrendering to the male's sexual advances. Were she to be upfront about her sexual 
desire (or the lack thereof), she would be quite vulnerable. The mystery that surrounds 
her sexuality, and its corollary natural female weakness ofruse, are nonetheless 
necessary for the ideal woman's well-being. She might be perceived as a tart if she were 
too forthright, or as frigid if she expressed her disinterest; either possibility is dangerous 
due to her financial dependence on her husband. The mystery is also necessary for the 
97 EE, p. 468. 
98 EE, pp. 468-469. 
99 The language used by Rousseau in the previous excerpt is troubling. The ideal man rejoices in his 
victory (sexual conquest) in part because he's not sure if he had consensual sex or not. Even though 
Rousseau briefly voices his disapproval of rape ("le plus libre et le plus doux de tous les actes n'admet 
point de violence réelle" E, p. 468), it invites an analysis of the t~xt in terms of the usefulness ofrape--
and/or the usefulness of the possibility of rape-- to the seduction game. 
100 EE, p. 469. 
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well-being of the ideal man for, as 1 will show, his physical ability to be sexual is 
limited. 
Because of the seduction game, the ideal man is supposed to confide in the ideal 
woman, to listen to her advice, to consult with her about important matters and to solve 
no problem without her assistance1ol • In this way, the ideal woman may covertly 
influence her mate's actions and opinions. She may thereby supplement her weakness lO2 • 
Though she is restricted to the private sphere, she may thusly shape his behaviour in the 
public sphere. Of course, she should not seek to usurp the ideal man's position as the 
master of the house; the patriarch. She should exert her power quietly while respecting 
his superiority as master of the household. This familiar arrangement is supposed to 
even out the power distribution in the marital unit as well as solidify the marital bond. 
The ideal woman is financially and physically dependent on the ideal man; he is 
sexually dependent on her because of "la modestie et la honte dont la nature arma le 
faible pour asservir le fortI03." According to this discourse, they are both dependent on 
each other in various ways; they are both influenced by each other's input. 
Why should the ideal woman participate in su ch a game of sexual refusaIs? 
Firstly, this may be explained by the fact that her dependence upon her mate is more 
critical than his dependence upon her; hence, the unofficial motto of the ideal woman is 
said to be "survivre, c'estséduire I04 ." She must maintain the ideal man's sexual interest 
in order to live; it is difficult to fathom how she could survive without his economic 
support. Playing the seduction game with the ideàl man thereby becomes a matter of 
survival. If she is not successful, she may be abandoned (or possibly injured) by her 
101 EE, p. 627. 
102 SP, p. 87. 
103 EE, p. 467. 
104 IE, p. 208 1 
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husband. 
Secondly, a particular law of nature dictates that "la femme [a] plus de facilité 
d'exciter les désirs [que] l'homme [a] de les satisfaire I05 ." The ideal man's sexual desire 
is greater than his physical ability to be sexual. Since his sexuality is linked to his 
sociability, so too does he possess a limited ability to be social; this is ironic, of course, 
since he is meant to spend much of his time in the public sphere tending to political and 
social matters. Male sexuality (and so also male sociability) may thus be understood as 
fragile and needy of female support. Socially, the ideal woman supports the ideal man 
through her domestic work and her greater social sensibilities. Sexually, female support 
cornes in the form of female modesty: 
it ensures both male potency in sexual encounters and 
male survival despite them. In the absence of female 
modesty, male desire would be either too weak to suit 
women's desire, or too strong to suit men's ability to 
perform106 • 
The ideal woman's refusaI of male sexual advances allows the ideal man to maintain the 
integrity ofhis virility. Periodic refusaIs help to eliminate occasions where he may be 
unable to perform sexually. The hypothetical absence of female modesty explains both a 
lack of male desire that would result in poor sexual performance, and an overly potent 
male des ire that could not equal his physical abilities. The ideal woman is thereby in 
charge ofbalancing the sexual (m'id also social) forces for the good of the marital unit 
and for the good of society. Female modesty works to avoid the emasculation of the 
ideal man and ultimately the destabilisation of society; it works to maintain his fragile 
sexual-- and social-- virility. In a broader sense, the ideal woman must play the 
seduction game in order to maintain the integrity of the ideal man. He is weakened when 
105 EE, p. 468. 
106 SP, pp. 38-39, 
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he is affiliated to his sex; it is a sensitive time for him. Without the proper support from 
the ideal woman, his con~tution may be compromised or corrupted. 
Rousseau's gender norms seek to establish two very distinct and opposite types; 
his prescriptions conceming sexual relations also seek to respect and reinforce this 
distinct oppositionality. In particular, the relative purity of each becomes important in 
the context of sexual relations. The ideal man is supposedly less pure because he must 
frequent the public sphere, a place that is "inevitably a locus of corruption, exploitation, 
and misery \07." Although the ideal man is undoubtedly more pure than other men who 
did not undergo the Rousseauist educational programme, he is less pure than the ideal 
woman. Rousseau believed that the ideal woman was lucky to be excluded from public 
life; he also believed that the distinctriess of the private sphere, or the home, served an 
immensely valuable purpose to society: 
According to Rousseau, the exclusion ofwomen from 
public life was necessary to preserve the purity and moral 
vigor of the home, so that the family could become the 
basis for the moral regeneration of societyI08. 
The public sphere is a place of corruption and exploitation where the private sphere is 
one of purity and morality. Though the ideal man is not corrupt and exploitive himself, it 
is likely taxing for him to move through a sphere where such social contaminants exist. 
Consequently, he is less pure. On the other hand, Sophie (or the ideal woman) is pure109 
and must maintain the family home as a safe haven ofpurity and morality. A social 
regeneration will occur because of this safe haven. In fact, women who did not respect 
their ideal were the cause of the degeneration of society. "These eighteenth century 
107 SPE, p. 29. 
108 SPE, p. 1 S, 
109 EE, p. 518. 
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Eves llO" could also be the cause of society's rebirth, provided they are willing to respect 
the gender norms put forth by Rousseau III. 
The relationship between purity and the split between the public and private 
sphere is echoed in the seduction game. The ideal man is less pure due to his prominent 
sexual desire. The ideal woman is more pure by virtue of the mysteriousness of her 
sexuality; because it is never clear how frequent or how strong her sexual urges are, she 
is in sorne sense spared the sullying influence of overt sexual desire. This relative purity 
allows her to maintain the sanctity of the home. She is not compromised by the 
negativity of the public sphere, nor apparently is she compromised by strong sexual 
desire. 
However, it is possible that she doesharbour strong sexual urges which she hides 
in order to play the seduction game. Mystery does not in fact equal purity; the ideal 
woman may have few sexual urges, or she may simply be concealing them. The purity is 
neither clearly established nor refuted; instead, the mysteriousness ofher sexuality is in 
effect mistaken for the purity ofher sexuality. 
In this light, the ideal woman's purity becomes illusory; an artifact necessary 
because oftheideal man's fragile sexuality. By extension, the purity of the domestic 
sphere may also be put into question. If the domestic goddess herself does not manifest 
an internaI sexual purity, the purity ofthe domestic sphere itselfmay in tum be 
compromised. An impure entity could not hope to maintain the purity of certain location. 
The oppositionality between purity and contamination is thus harder to maintain. 
Destabilising elements are at work within the very concept ofpurity. 
If men and women are in close proximity, they risk contaminating each other 
110 SPE, p. 18. 
III Another case where Rousseau makes a prescription about how families should be in his time. 
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with their particular gender norms. Men and women have different bodies; the se bodies 
in tum require that the y respect norms that are specific to their body, or their sex. The 
segregation of the sexes in their respective spheres is one way in which the 
distinctiveness of each is meant to be maintained. If they acted within the same sphere, if 
the y interacted excessively, they would contaminate each other. Each would lose hold of 
the 'natural' traits and skills that are supposed to be emblematic oftheir sex. Here, we 
retum to the issue of the threat of contamination; it is a perpetuaI concem for Rousseau 
and the ideal types he theorises into being. Constant vigilance is required. 
Instead of retuming to the consequences suffered by those who disregard their 
gender norms, l will now suggest that, without the distinct oppositionality of the sexes, 
the ide al woman could not covertly rule over the ideal man. Due to her weakness, her 
aIluring but mode st sexual appeal, her dependence and her supposed purity, she is able 
to influence him covertly through the withholding and granting of sexual favours. Sexual 
relations thereby become the arena in which the distinctiveness of each sex is meant to 
be assertèd as weIl as maintained. 
Sexual relations between the ideal man and the ideal woman are intended to 
perpetuate the matrices ofbinarities elaborated in Rousseau's phantasmatic topography. 
Sexual relations seek to maintain the division between those binarities l've already 
addressed such as: activity versus passivity, independence versus dependence, and 
susceptibility to others' opinions versus indifference to opinions. It also introduces new 
binaries which further shape the phantasmatic topography: insatiability versus sexual 
indifference, virility versus impotence, and ev en death versus life. AlI of these are 
affiliated with either the male or female gender, and with either nature or society. 
Through sexual relations, the ideal man is supposed to maintain his activity, 
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independence, indifference to opinion, insatiability, virility, as well as his own life. The 
ideal woman acts as a means for the ideal man to achieve these ends. Just as the gender 
norms dictated that she became the not quite natural mixed-entity who is of service to 
her species so that he may become the perversely natural and "heartier" telos of nature 
(the individual), she must also use gender norms to reduce and restrict herself so that the 
ideal man's sexuality may be fully and properly (read: with virility) manifested. In both 
cases, her work is supportive. Firstly, her work permits the ideal man to separate himself 
from his species by becoming an individual, a being-for-itself. Secondly, her work 
allows him to save face, sexually speaking, while remaining the true master of their 
heterosexual pairing. The ideal woman, in aU things, is meant to be of service; she is a 
truncated being in effect so that the male may be whole on his own. Their union is not 
one of two halves formirig a single who le. 
However, if pressure is applied to this regimented split, the binaries collapse in 
upon themselves. The text thereby undoes itself. 1 will examine two particular cases of 
this: the ideal woman's activity and passivity, and the way sex itself straddles life and 
death, nature and society. 1 wil1 approach the second case through a brief consideration 
of the ideal man's immunity and susceptibility to others' opinions. 
Superficially, the ideàl woman is passive during the seduction game. She is 
meant to refuse or to acquiesce. She is the object of desire; her status as a sexual being, 
while not denied outright by Rousseau, is at least camouflaged by the mystery that 
surrounds her sexuality. It should never be clear whether she is refusing sex because she 
is not interested, or because she is being coy. When she does consent to sex, these 
occasions are characterised as "rare and precious" to her husband; her engagement or 
enjoyment is fairly irrelevant. The nature of sexuality is fundamentally male. The 
seduction game as weIl as the perspective with which sex is approached in Émile 
underline this point. The male is supposed to be active, soliciting, while the female is 
passive and periodically receptive. 
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Despite this supposed passivity, the ideal woman's role in the seduction game is 
surprisingly active (much as her work during a child's first education is also surprisingly 
active). She must, through modest refusaIs, maintain the ideal man's sexual interest. This 
seems to involve sorne contorsions; she has to find the correct balance between refusaIs 
and acceptances. Additionally, for the ideal woman, the main perk of the seduction game 
involves wielding covert power over her husband. If she appears sufficiently passive 
(although in fact this is an active process on her part), she may later have the chance to 
be overtly active (thanks to her covert power). She must therefore be passive in order to 
be active. In this way, the seed ofactivity lies within passivity's core. Now, the task of 
the ideal woman is to be active while maintaining the illusion ofpassivity. In order to 
pass as the woman who is respectful of her gender nonns, she must conceal the activity 
that is inherent to her task. To be active, she must assume a pose of passivity. The two 
halvesofthe binary cannot stand apart; they exist in symbiotic relationship with one 
another, simultaneously allowing the possibility oftheir realisation, and refusing it. 
As previously established, the ideal man should not be susceptible to others' 
opinions. If he possessed such a suscèptibility, he would risk being contaminated by 
undesirable social elements which are (and should remain) foreign to his constitution. 
This indifference to others' opinions is one of the main personality traits of the ideal 
man. Despite this assertion, because of the seduction game, the ideal man is supposed to 
be receptive to his wife's input. How can this be? 
In a strict sense, what Rousseau seeks to avoid happens in the very text he has 
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written: the two sexes contaminate each other. Through sex, the ideal woman influences 
the decisions and opinions of her husband, the ideal man. She is supposed to restrict her 
influence so that he maystill remain the head of the household; regardless of this 
restraint, she is still shaping his behaviour and, by extension, his constitution. He is 
meant to be immune to the opinions of others, yet he is not immune to his wife's input. 
Because of the seduction game elaborated by Rousseau himselj, contamination occurs 
between husband and wife. Contamination exists precisely where Rousseau seeks to 
eliminate it. The instability of the categories Rousseau creates is exposed. The ideal 
womansurreptitiously contaminates the ideal man, despite aIl efforts to keep the two 
distinct from one another. 
Because sex brings the instability inherent in the text to the forefront, 1 will show 
how sex straddles life and death, then how it straddles nature and society. Sex represents 
the possibility of life because it perpetuates the species; heterosexual sex often results in 
babies: Due to her close affiliation with the species (via the secondary and female telos 
of nature) as weIl as her physical ability to bear children, the ideal woman best 
represents life. Sex also represents the possibility of death. As it was suggested in the 
quotation at the start of the chapter, sex-- if improperly used-- has the potential to 
destroy the hum~mspecies. The ideal man seems tied to the possibility of death, where 
death is understood literally or figuratively; the ideal man may actually cease to exist or 
he may be drawn away from his ideal and thereby suffer a "figurative deathll2." Ifhis 
sex drive were not controlled by the ideal woman, he would be killed, or at least 
emasculated, by insatiability or impotence. 
112 By figurative death, 1 mean that the man who fell from his ideal would have suffered a horrible fate; 
one which-- while not necessarily death itself (though a literai death may folJow a fall from one's 
. idea\)-- would be reniiniscent of death in its finality and irreversibility. 
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Sexual relations may be particularly dangerous to the ideal man because he is 
supposed to only "be" his sex at certain times. To be affiliated with one's sex is to be 
close to one's species. Serving the ends of the species is not the natural telos which the 
ideal man is called to respect; he is meant to embody the perversely natural telos of the 
individual. Therefore, the ideal man is particularly vulnerable when he must "be" his 
sex. AlI the hard work of making him into an individual may be compromised; the threat 
of contamination figures both in the co-mingling ofthe sexes through marriage and in 
the sexual couplings. This may partially explain the need for the seduction game; the 
game is meant to lessen the risks to the ideal man. 
1s it in fact accurate to link the male and death? 1nstead it may be more accurate 
to say that the ideal woman represents death-- and life. Since she is always her sex, 
'al ways intimately tied with the species, from the male perspective, the ideal woman 
represents the possibility of death. She embodies every trait from which he distances 
himself. However, she also represents the possibility of life by virtue of her physical 
capabilities and the gender roles assigned to her. For the ideal man, she is a useful and 
pleasant necessity, yet she also represents the possibility of his undoing (his literaI or 
figurative death). Both possibilities exist in the same moment, thereby metaphorically 
and simultaneously allowing and refusing each possibility. 
Sex is also related to the binary of nature and society. Sex is natural in the sense 
that it existedin the state of nature, even though it occurred in a different way than 
Rousseau believesit should occur in society. Sex is also understood as natural because it 
is linked to the "original" and lesser conception ofnature, where beings are meant to be 
of service to the species. However, since this particular or "female" conception of . 
nature, to which ideal women belong exemplarily; is devalued in comparison to the 
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"male" conception of nature that produces individuals, the naturalness of sex is likewise 
put into question. It becomes something which is "beneath" the "natural" male 
individual, although the individual may still crave it. As mentioned above, sex certainly 
presents a risk to him. 
Society exists within the concept of sex too. Firstly, it is through marri age and 
sex that the ideal man is fully "brought into" society. Secondly, sex must be tempered by 
the ideal woman's modesty. Rousseau says this modesty is given to the ideal woman by 
nature. However, in Rousseau's logic, such modesty cannot be natural; coyness is a 
social product since it did not figure within the "most pure" state of nature. As 1 
mentioned, in the more primitive state of nature, couplings occurred without regard to 
modesty or convention; they occurred randomly and only out of sexual need. In general, 
the ideal woman is more sociable or socialised than the ideal man, thus her role in sex is 
both natural (in the feminine sense of the term) and social. She represents a threat of 
contamination in both respects; she belongs to two realms which are supposed to remain 
distinct from the ideal man, the individual par excellence. However, it is necessary that 
the ideal man be "socialised" or given a social context through marriage and sex. 
Without this "social initiation," his functionality in the public sphere (his public sphere) 
would suffer. The ideal woman is in sorne sense "the potentially contaminating bridge" 
between both the concepts offeminine nature and society, as weIl as between the ideal 
man and society. 
Heterosexual sex-- or the co-minglingofthe ideal man and the ideal woman-- is 
necessary but dangerous. Although Rousseau wishes to keep the two sexes apart, their 
interaction is unavoidable and even required; their interaction results in the blurring of 
the distinctions Rousseau made between the two of them. The phantasmatic tOpOgàlphy, 
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including the gender nonns and gender-based oppositions, he created necessarily 
collapses in upon itself. Each tenn of a binary cannot exist entirely apart from its 
opposite; though they are not meant to exist apart, they both must have their own 
distinctness. The "seed" that undoes Rousseau's phantasmatic topography is embedded 
within the very structure he created. 
Conclusion: Looking Back And Looking Ahead 
ln this project, 1 have done my best to sketch sorne of the gender norms that 
follow from nature as they are outlined by Rousseau in Émile. These gender norms are 
part of Rousseau's phantasmatic topography. 1 used these gender norms as a means of 
showing that, despite Rousseau's claim to the contrary, the ideal man and the ideal 
woman are not two halves of a (maritally bonded) whole. Additionally, the gender 
norms result in the creation Of(t~oUature: one proper to the ideal woman, the 
~~ . 
other (and better one) proper to the ideal man. 
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1 then turned my attention to the issue of contamination and how it threatens the 
starkly opposedgender norms in both ways that Rousseau identifies and ways he 
apparently fails to notice. 1 primarily used cases (stated and unstated) of contamination 
to trouble the Rousseauist natural gendered oppositions as weIl as his phantasmatic 
topography. With the help of Judith Butler, 1 also questioned the most basic split ofhis 
phantasmatic topography: the two sexes, male and female. 
FinaIly,1 examined sexual relations between the ideal man and the ideal woman; 
1 showed that this is an exemplary site at which the lines that divide Rousseau's gender 
norms and the differences that demarcate his phantasmatic topography blur together in 
an extraordinary fashion. 
The theme that draws aIl these analyses together is Rousseau's construction of 
nature and the natural. With the help of Jacques Derrida's deconstructive strategies, 1 
sought to bring to light the incoherencies that allowed Rousseau's theoretical writings to 
assert themselves just as they und id themselves; 1 sought to bring to light parts of the 
text that were uncriticised and underdeyeloped. 
While 1 believe this work is relevant within the confines of philosophical 
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academia, it may also prove to be use fuI in a broader sense; uncriticised and 
underdeveloped appeals to nature persist in contemporary society. Many ofthe ideas put 
forth by Rousseau wi11likely be familiar to us; for example, consider the heterosexual 
marital unit being a whole oftwo halves, or the woman wielding covert power over the 
man thanks to her sexuality. 
With that in mind, may this work serve not only as a feminist and deconstructive 
analysis of Émile. It is my wish that it may also serve as a reminder to question and 
criticise arguments or opinions based upon appeals to nature that exist in contemporary 
society. They too are likely based upon incoherencies and dependent upon 
supplementation; with a bit of work, their justifications may be troubled as weIl. This 
troubling is necessary and valuable; cultivating such an "esprit critique" is an 
. exceptionally important tool for the dtizens oftoday's society. 
VI 
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